Complex Event Analysis - Report

Key Focus

(Silicon Valley is simply never going to cooperate with the Pentagon nearly to the degree that China's burgeoning high-tech sector cooperates with its government.) China is the pacing threat the U.S. military now measures itself against.
This American refusal to yield blue water territory to China is championed by liberal hawks who will likely staff any incoming Democratic administration's Asia portfolios, to say nothing of the Republicans.both pro- and anti-President Donald Trump

This is an emotional as well as a historical commitment: something I have personally experienced as an embed on U.S. military warships in the Western Pacific.
In fact, the U.S. Defense Department is much more energized by the China threat than by the Russia one

It is precisely the fusion of military, trade, economic, and ideological tensions, combined with the destabilization wrought by the digital age - with its collapse of physical distance - that has created an unvirtuous cycle for relations between the United States and China.
The geopolitical challenge of the first half of the 21st century is stark: how to prevent the U.S.-China cold war from going hot.
Preventing a hot war means intensified diplomacy not only from the State Department but also from the Pentagon - American generals talking and visiting with Chinese generals in order to create a network of relationships that are the equivalent of the old Cold War hotline

In order to understand what is going on, we have to stop artificially separating U.S.-China trade tensions and U.S.-China military tensions.
There is also the ideological aspect of this new cold war. For several decades, China's breakneck development was seen positively in the United States, and the relatively enlightened authoritarianism of Deng Xiaoping and his successors was easily tolerated, especially by the American business community

When a Chinese vessel cut across the bow of an American destroyer, or China denied entry of a U.S. amphibious assault ship to Hong Kong - as happened last fall - this cannot be separated from the atmosphere of charged rhetoric over trade

Momentum supporting factors

(american,china,trade)

(china,military)

(chinese,military)

(american,united_states)

(trade,united_states)

(china,chinese)

(american,economic)

(chinese,economic)

(american,digital)

(american,cold_war)

Challenge supporting factors

(china,military)

(china,progressives)

(china,progressives,trade)

(progressives,trade)

(china,trade,white_house)

(china,white_house)

(trade,white_house)

(china,trade,trumpsters)

(trade,trumpsters)

(china,trade,trading)

Work-in-progress supporting factors

(american,china)

(american,china,trade)

(china,trade,trump)

(trade,trump)

(china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership)

(china,separating,trade)

(china,chinese)

(china,military)

(american,military)

(chinese,trade)

Complex Event Time Series Summary - REPORT

Time Period	Challenge	Momentum	WIP
Report	42.23	18.33	39.45

High Level Abstraction (HLA) combined

High Level Abstraction (HLA)	Report
(1) (china,military)	100.00
(2) (american,china,trade)	93.71
(3) (american,china)	67.37
(4) (china,progressives)	52.69
(5) (china,progressives,trade)	51.80
(6) (progressives,trade)	51.20
(7) (american,military)	49.10
(8) (china,trade,white_house)	41.32
(9) (china,white_house)	40.72
(10) (trade,white_house)	40.42
(11) (china,trade,trumpsters)	38.92
(12) (trade,trumpsters)	38.02
(13) (china,trade,trump)	36.83
(14) (china,chinese)	36.83
(15) (trade,trump)	35.63
(16) (china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership)	34.73
(17) (china,trade,trading)	33.23
(18) (china,technology,trade)	31.44
(19) (china,stealing,trade)	31.14
(20) (china,separating,trade)	30.84
(21) (china,riles,trade)	30.54
(22) (trade,united_states)	27.25
(23) (china,threat)	26.05
(24) (american,united_states)	25.45
(25) (chinese,united_states)	24.85
(26) (chinese,trade)	18.56
(27) (american,economic)	17.07
(28) (chinese,military)	16.77
(29) (american,digital)	14.67
(30) (china,democratic)	14.07
(31) (china,western_pacific)	13.77
(32) (american,threat)	13.47
(33) (american,cold_war)	13.47
(34) (military,trade)	11.68
(35) (economic,trade)	11.68
(36) (american,yield)	11.38
(37) (china,yield)	11.08
(38) (china,unencumbered)	10.78
(39) (chinese,economic)	9.28
(40) (chinese,cold_war)	6.29
(41) (cold_war,trade)	5.99
(42) (american,unvirtuous)	5.69
(43) (trade,unvirtuous)	5.39
(44) (american,uncharismatic)	5.09
(45) (american,trade)	4.79
(46) (american,technocrats)	4.19
(47) (chinese,soviet_union)	2.40
(48) (chinese,rulers)	2.10
(49) (chinese,economies-of-scale)	1.80
(50) (chinese,economies)	1.50
(51) (chinese,dovetails)	0.90
(52) (chinese,destabilizing)	0.60
(53) (assuaged,chinese)	0.30

Complex Event Analysis - REPORT

Supporting narratives:

momentum (Read more)

It is precisely the fusion of military, trade, economic, and ideological tensions, combined with the destabilization wrought by the digital age - with its collapse of physical distance - that has created an unvirtuous cycle for relations between the United States and China.
The geopolitical challenge of the first half of the 21st century is stark: how to prevent the U.S.-China cold war from going hot.
Preventing a hot war means intensified diplomacy not only from the State Department but also from the Pentagon - American generals talking and visiting with Chinese generals in order to create a network of relationships that are the equivalent of the old Cold War hotline
High Level Abstractions:

(trade,united_states)
(chinese,economic)
(american,china,trade)
(chinese,military)
(american,united_states)
(american,unvirtuous)
(china,chinese)
(trade,unvirtuous)
(american,economic)
(american,digital)
(china,military)
Inferred entity relationships (20)
(china,military,twenty-first) [inferred]
(american,china,military) [inferred]
(china,trade,white_house) [inferred]
(china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
(china,military,threat) [inferred]
(china,military,troops) [inferred]
(china,trade,trumpsters) [inferred]
(china,trade,trump) [inferred]
(american,china,european) [inferred]
(china,trade) [inferred]
(china,trade,trading) [inferred]
(american,china,trump) [inferred]
(american,china) [inferred]
(china,military,separating) [inferred]
(china,military,united_states) [inferred]
(china,military,trade) [inferred]
(china,military,western_pacific) [inferred]
(china,military,yield) [inferred]
(china,military,staff) [inferred]
(china,military,we_would_fight_china) [inferred]

momentum (Read more)

It is precisely the fusion of military, trade, economic, and ideological tensions, combined with the destabilization wrought by the digital age - with its collapse of physical distance - that has created an unvirtuous cycle for relations between the United States and China.
The geopolitical challenge of the first half of the 21st century is stark: how to prevent the U.S.-China cold war from going hot.
Preventing a hot war means intensified diplomacy not only from the State Department but also from the Pentagon - American generals talking and visiting with Chinese generals in order to create a network of relationships that are the equivalent of the old Cold War hotline.
High Level Abstractions:

(american,cold_war)

momentum (Read more)

And China will be a more formidable adversary than Russia ever was." I went on to explain that the wars of the future would be naval, with all of their abstract battle systems, even though dirty counterinsurgency fights were all the rage 14 years ago.
That future has arrived, and it is nothing less than a new cold war: The constant, interminable Chinese computer hacks of American warships'maintenance records, Pentagon personnel records, and so forth constitute war by other means
High Level Abstractions:

(chinese,trade)

challenge (Read more)

The fact is, since President Richard Nixon went to China in 1972, U.S. policy toward the Pacific has been notably consistent whatever party has held the White House, and the turn against China has likewise been a bipartisan affair - and thus unlikely to be dramatically affected by any impeachment or presidential election.
Regarding the trade talks themselves, what really riles both the Trumpsters and the Democrats (moderates and progressives alike) is the very way China does business: stealing intellectual property, acquiring sensitive technology through business buyouts, fusing public and private sectors so that their companies have an unfair advantage (at least by the mores of a global capitalistic trading system), currency manipulation, and so on
High Level Abstractions:

(china,white_house)
(china,trade,trumpsters)
(china,progressives,trade)
(progressives,trade)
(china,riles,trade)
(china,progressives)
(trade,white_house)
(china,stealing,trade)
(trade,trumpsters)
(china,trade,white_house)
(china,technology,trade)
Inferred entity relationships (12)
(china,trade,trump) [inferred]
(china,trade,white_house) [inferred]
(china,trade) [inferred]
(china,trade,trading) [inferred]
(trade,trumpsters) [inferred]
(china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
(trade,white_house) [inferred]
(progressives,trade) [inferred]
(china,technology) [inferred]
(china,progressives) [inferred]
(china,progressives,trade) [inferred]
(china,trade,trumpsters) [inferred]

challenge (Read more)

The fact is, since President Richard Nixon went to China in 1972, U.S. policy toward the Pacific has been notably consistent whatever party has held the White House, and the turn against China has likewise been a bipartisan affair - and thus unlikely to be dramatically affected by any impeachment or presidential election.
Regarding the trade talks themselves, what really riles both the Trumpsters and the Democrats (moderates and progressives alike) is the very way China does business: stealing intellectual property, acquiring sensitive technology through business buyouts, fusing public and private sectors so that their companies have an unfair advantage (at least by the mores of a global capitalistic trading system), currency manipulation, and so on.
High Level Abstractions:

(china,trade,trading)
Inferred entity relationships (5)
(china,trade,trump) [inferred]
(china,trade,white_house) [inferred]
(china,trade) [inferred]
(china,trade,trumpsters) [inferred]
(china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]

challenge (Read more)

(Silicon Valley is simply never going to cooperate with the Pentagon nearly to the degree that China's burgeoning high-tech sector cooperates with its government.) China is the pacing threat the U.S. military now measures itself against.
This American refusal to yield blue water territory to China is championed by liberal hawks who will likely staff any incoming Democratic administration's Asia portfolios, to say nothing of the Republicans.both pro- and anti-President Donald Trump
High Level Abstractions:

(american,threat)
(american,military)
(china,yield)
(china,threat)
(china,democratic)
(american,china)
(american,yield)
(china,military)
Inferred entity relationships (14)
(china,military,twenty-first) [inferred]
(american,china,military) [inferred]
(american,china,european) [inferred]
(american,china,trump) [inferred]
(american,china,trade) [inferred]
(china,military,separating) [inferred]
(china,military,united_states) [inferred]
(china,military,trade) [inferred]
(china,military,threat) [inferred]
(china,military,western_pacific) [inferred]
(china,military,yield) [inferred]
(china,military,staff) [inferred]
(china,military,troops) [inferred]
(china,military,we_would_fight_china) [inferred]

challenge (Read more)

This is an emotional as well as a historical commitment: something I have personally experienced as an embed on U.S. military warships in the Western Pacific.
In fact, the U.S. Defense Department is much more energized by the China threat than by the Russia one
High Level Abstractions:

(china,military)
(china,western_pacific)
Inferred entity relationships (10)
(china,military,twenty-first) [inferred]
(china,military,separating) [inferred]
(china,military,united_states) [inferred]
(china,military,trade) [inferred]
(china,military,threat) [inferred]
(china,military,western_pacific) [inferred]
(china,military,yield) [inferred]
(china,military,staff) [inferred]
(china,military,troops) [inferred]
(china,military,we_would_fight_china) [inferred]

challenge (Read more)

This is an emotional as well as a historical commitment: something I have personally experienced as an embed on U.S. military warships in the Western Pacific.
In fact, the U.S. Defense Department is much more energized by the China threat than by the Russia one. It considers China, with its nimble ability as a rising technological power - unencumbered by America's own glacial bureaucratic oversight - to catch up and perhaps surpass the United States in 5G networks and digital battle systems
High Level Abstractions:

(china,threat)
(china,unencumbered)

challenge (Read more)

Indeed, this new cold war is more susceptible to irrational passions fueled by economic disruptions than the old Cold War.
In the second half of the 20th century, the United States and the Soviet Union each had internal economies-of-scale (however different from each other), that were far better protected from the destabilizing forces of globalization than the American and Chinese economies are now
High Level Abstractions:

(american,united_states)
(trade,united_states)
(american,cold_war)
(cold_war,trade)
(economic,trade)
(chinese,united_states)
(american,economic)
(chinese,economies-of-scale)
(chinese,economies)
(chinese,cold_war)
(chinese,soviet_union)

challenge (Read more)

defense establishment, both uniformed and civilian, considers the United States a Pacific power for all time: Witness Commodore Matthew Perry's opening of Japan to trade in 1853, America's subjugation and occupation of the Philippines starting in 1899, the bloody Marine landings on a plethora of Pacific islands in World War II, the defeat and rebuilding of Japan following World War II, the Korean and Vietnam wars, and, most important, Washington's current treaty alliances stretching from Japan south to Australia
High Level Abstractions:

(trade,united_states)

challenge (Read more)

Indeed, this new cold war is more susceptible to irrational passions fueled by economic disruptions than the old Cold War.
In the second half of the 20th century, the United States and the Soviet Union each had internal economies-of-scale (however different from each other), that were far better protected from the destabilizing forces of globalization than the American and Chinese economies are now.
High Level Abstractions:

(chinese,destabilizing)

WIP (Read more)

When a Chinese vessel cut across the bow of an American destroyer, or China denied entry of a U.S. amphibious assault ship to Hong Kong - as happened last fall - this cannot be separated from the atmosphere of charged rhetoric over trade
High Level Abstractions:

(china,chinese)
(american,china,trade)
(chinese,trade)
(american,china)
Inferred entity relationships (11)
(china,trade,trump) [inferred]
(american,china,military) [inferred]
(china,trade,white_house) [inferred]
(american,china,european) [inferred]
(china,trade) [inferred]
(china,trade,trading) [inferred]
(american,china,trump) [inferred]
(american,china) [inferred]
(american,china,trade) [inferred]
(china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
(china,trade,trumpsters) [inferred]

WIP (Read more)

As for the so-called restrainers and neo-isolationists, when you boil it right down, they are really about getting American ground troops out of the Middle East, something that may actually strengthen the U.S. And as for left-wing Democratic progressives, when it comes to a hard line on trade talks with China, they are not too far away from Trump's own economic advisors. Remember that the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton was forced to publicly disown the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement because of pressure from her own party
High Level Abstractions:

(china,trade,trump)
(economic,trade)
(trade,trump)
Inferred entity relationships (6)
(trade,trump) [inferred]
(china,trade,white_house) [inferred]
(china,trade) [inferred]
(china,trade,trading) [inferred]
(china,trade,trumpsters) [inferred]
(china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]

WIP (Read more)

As for the so-called restrainers and neo-isolationists, when you boil it right down, they are really about getting American ground troops out of the Middle East, something that may actually strengthen the U.S. And as for left-wing Democratic progressives, when it comes to a hard line on trade talks with China, they are not too far away from Trump's own economic advisors. Remember that the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton was forced to publicly disown the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement because of pressure from her own party.
High Level Abstractions:

(china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership)
Inferred entity relationships (5)
(china,trade,trump) [inferred]
(china,trade,white_house) [inferred]
(china,trade) [inferred]
(china,trade,trading) [inferred]
(china,trade,trumpsters) [inferred]

WIP (Read more)

In order to understand what is going on, we have to stop artificially separating U.S.-China trade tensions and U.S.-China military tensions.
There is also the ideological aspect of this new cold war
High Level Abstractions:

(china,separating,trade)

WIP (Read more)

In order to understand what is going on, we have to stop artificially separating U.S.-China trade tensions and U.S.-China military tensions.
There is also the ideological aspect of this new cold war. For several decades, China's breakneck development was seen positively in the United States, and the relatively enlightened authoritarianism of Deng Xiaoping and his successors was easily tolerated, especially by the American business community
High Level Abstractions:

(china,military)
Inferred entity relationships (10)
(china,military,separating) [inferred]
(china,military,twenty-first) [inferred]
(china,military,united_states) [inferred]
(china,military,trade) [inferred]
(china,military,threat) [inferred]
(china,military,western_pacific) [inferred]
(china,military,yield) [inferred]
(china,military,staff) [inferred]
(china,military,troops) [inferred]
(china,military,we_would_fight_china) [inferred]

WIP (Read more)

And because the U.S.-China relationship is the world's most crucial - with many second- and third-order effects - a cold war between the two is becoming the negative organizing principle of geopolitics that markets will just have to price in.
This is because the differences between the United States and China are stark and fundamental. They can barely be managed by negotiations and can never really be assuaged.
The Chinese are committed to pushing U.S. naval and air forces away from the Western Pacific (the South and East China seas), whereas the U.S. military is determined to stay put
High Level Abstractions:

(assuaged,chinese)
(chinese,united_states)
(china,chinese)

WIP (Read more)

But Washington can win if it stays more patient than June 2005, I published a cover story in the Atlantic, "How We Would Fight China." I wrote that, "The American military contest with China - will define the twenty-first century. And China will be a more formidable adversary than Russia ever was." I went on to explain that the wars of the future would be naval, with all of their abstract battle systems, even though dirty counterinsurgency fights were all the rage 14 years ago.
That future has arrived, and it is nothing less than a new cold war: The constant, interminable Chinese computer hacks of American warships'maintenance records, Pentagon personnel records, and so forth constitute war by other means
High Level Abstractions:

(american,military)

WIP (Read more)

Indeed, this new cold war is more susceptible to irrational passions fueled by economic disruptions than the old Cold War.
In the second half of the 20th century, the United States and the Soviet Union each had internal economies-of-scale (however different from each other), that were far better protected from the destabilizing forces of globalization than the American and Chinese economies are now. It is precisely the fusion of military, trade, economic, and ideological tensions, combined with the destabilization wrought by the digital age - with its collapse of physical distance - that has created an unvirtuous cycle for relations between the United States and China.
The geopolitical challenge of the first half of the 21st century is stark: how to prevent the U.S.-China cold war from going hot.
Preventing a hot war means intensified diplomacy not only from the State Department but also from the Pentagon - American generals talking and visiting with Chinese generals in order to create a network of relationships that are the equivalent of the old Cold War hotline
High Level Abstractions:

(american,trade)
(chinese,trade)
(american,military)
(military,trade)
Inferred entity relationships (1)
(american,trade,trump) [inferred]

WIP (Read more)

Rather than a collegial group of uncharismatic technocrats constrained by retirement rules, there is now a president-for-life with a budding personality cult, overseeing thought control by digital means.including facial recognition and following the internet searches of its citizens. It is becoming rather creepy, and American leaders of both parties are increasingly repelled by it
High Level Abstractions:

(american,digital)

WIP (Read more)

Rather than a collegial group of uncharismatic technocrats constrained by retirement rules, there is now a president-for-life with a budding personality cult, overseeing thought control by digital means.including facial recognition and following the internet searches of its citizens
High Level Abstractions:

(american,uncharismatic)
(american,technocrats)

WIP (Read more)

In order to understand what is going on, we have to stop artificially separating U.S.-China trade tensions and U.S.-China military tensions.
There is also the ideological aspect of this new cold war.
High Level Abstractions:

(military,trade)

WIP (Read more)

So China will wait a number of years until it surpasses Japan in naval and air power. Beijing's rulers know how closely their strategy dovetails with the feelings of the Chinese masses. Indeed, this new cold war is more susceptible to irrational passions fueled by economic disruptions than the old Cold War.
In the second half of the 20th century, the United States and the Soviet Union each had internal economies-of-scale (however different from each other), that were far better protected from the destabilizing forces of globalization than the American and Chinese economies are now
High Level Abstractions:

(chinese,rulers)
(chinese,dovetails)

WIP (Read more)

Beijing's rulers know how closely their strategy dovetails with the feelings of the Chinese masses. Indeed, this new cold war is more susceptible to irrational passions fueled by economic disruptions than the old Cold War.
In the second half of the 20th century, the United States and the Soviet Union each had internal economies-of-scale (however different from each other), that were far better protected from the destabilizing forces of globalization than the American and Chinese economies are now
High Level Abstractions:

(chinese,economic)

Target rule match count: 69.0 Challenge: 0.21 Momentum: 0.09 WIP: 0.20