Complex Event Analysis - Report

Key Focus

  • General Accounting Office summarized the situation in 2002: "We identified nearly 700 individual commitments on how China's trade regime will adhere to the organization's agreements, principles, and rules. Other commitments grant market access to other members'goods and services." China's accession package was based on early-1990s trade rules, and the global economy has evolved significantly since then
  • Post-WTO accession, all trade-related regulations had to be offered for public comment and then openly published, giving the U.S. government a chance to beat back discriminatory rules and limiting Chinese officials from capriciously invoking vague laws against U.S. For the first time, non-Chinese companies located in China were granted the right to trade internationally and distribute those goods domestically within China, eliminating a previous requirement to use Chinese state-owned monopolies to conduct much of their operations
  • Drawing on the experiences of the two dozen former officials I interviewed, and on my own review of the history of U.S.-China relations since Nixon's 1972 visit, here are the potential building blocks of a U.S. strategy towards China for the coming decades.
    U.S. security and prosperity is enhanced with strong military alliances and trade partnerships, none more so than in the Asia-Pacific.
  • It's their region." While Beijing's overall implementation of nonproliferation rules has not been perfect, U.S. forces and allies are today safer with China inside the tent than if the workshop of the world had been left outside.
    Before the coronavirus outbreak and events in Hong Kong grabbed the headlines over the last few months, the Trump administration spent the better part of three years decrying China's "unfair" and "not reciprocal" trade practices.
  • No momentum supporting factor found

    Challenge supporting factors

  • (beijing,china,policy)
  • (chinese,trade)
  • (china,policies)
  • (china,trade)
  • (china,chinese,trade-related)
  • (china,chinese,trade)
  • (china,chinese,state-owned)
  • (china,chinese,proclaim)
  • (china,chinese,president_jiang_zemin)
  • (american,china)
  • Work-in-progress supporting factors

  • (china,security)
  • (chinese,wto)
  • (china,chinese,wto)
  • (chinese,policies,wto)
  • (china,chinese,wanton)
  • (china,policy,wanton)
  • (china,trade)
  • (china,chinese,tiananmen_square)
  • (china,policy,tiananmen_square)
  • (china,global)
  • Complex Event Time Series Summary - REPORT


    Time PeriodChallengeMomentumWIP
    Report58.93 0.00 41.08

    High Level Abstraction (HLA) combined

    High Level Abstraction (HLA)Report
    (1) (china,trade)100.00
    (2) (china,policies)82.10
    (3) (china,trump)66.48
    (4) (beijing,china,policy)65.70
    (5) (chinese,trade)64.66
    (6) (china,global)57.29
    (7) (china,security)55.58
    (8) (china,military)54.80
    (9) (chinese,wto)53.35
    (10) (american,china)50.60
    (11) (chinese,united_states)45.98
    (12) (china,chinese,wto)43.49
    (13) (chinese,policies,wto)42.76
    (14) (china,chinese,wanton)42.14
    (15) (china,policy,wanton)41.57
    (16) (china,chinese,trade-related)41.00
    (17) (china,chinese,trade)40.37
    (18) (china,chinese,tiananmen_square)39.34
    (19) (china,policy,tiananmen_square)38.76
    (20) (china,chinese,state-owned)38.19
    (21) (china,chinese,society)37.57
    (22) (chinese,society)37.10
    (23) (china,chinese,security)36.84
    (24) (china,chinese,purges)36.17
    (25) (china,chinese,proclaim)35.55
    (26) (china,chinese,president_jiang_zemin)34.92
    (27) (china,chinese,policy)34.30
    (28) (beijing,policy)32.17
    (29) (china,policy,wmd)30.77
    (30) (policy,wmd)30.67
    (31) (china,policy,united_states)30.25
    (32) (beijing,trump)30.15
    (33) (policy,united_states)29.99
    (34) (beijing,policies)29.84
    (35) (beijing,china,trump)29.48
    (36) (policy,technology)28.91
    (37) (china,policy,trump)28.91
    (38) (china,policy,technology)28.39
    (39) (china,technology)28.02
    (40) (beijing,china,tamed)27.50
    (41) (china,policy,tamed)27.09
    (42) (policy,tamed)26.67
    (43) (china,policy,state_bob_einhorn)26.52
    (44) (china,policy,soldiers)26.05
    (45) (beijing,united_states)25.58
    (46) (beijing,china,united_states)25.06
    (47) (beijing,trade)25.01
    (48) (beijing,china,policies)24.75
    (49) (beijing,chinese,trade)24.39
    (50) (beijing,china,washington)23.56
    (51) (beijing,china,wariness)22.99
    (52) (beijing,china,survivability)22.57
    (53) (beijing,china,split)22.00
    (54) (beijing,china,politics)21.43
    (55) (beijing,china,non-ideological)20.86
    (56) (global,policy)19.93
    (57) (chinese,policies,trade)15.26
    (58) (chinese,policies,united_states)14.43
    (59) (beijing,chinese,trans-pacific_partnership)13.96
    (60) (chinese,policies,trans-pacific_partnership)13.23
    (61) (chinese,policies,technology)12.71
    (62) (chinese,policies,summer)12.09
    (63) (chinese,policies,subvert)11.52
    (64) (chinese,policies,state_mike_pompeo)10.95
    (65) (chinese,policies,rules-based)10.38
    (66) (chinese,policies,religious)9.81
    (67) (chinese,policies,publicize)9.24
    (68) (beijing,wto)7.94
    (69) (beijing,chinese,wto)7.37
    (70) (beijing,chinese,wrongly)6.75
    (71) (beijing,chinese,wealth)6.23
    (72) (beijing,chinese,trump)5.71
    (73) (chinese,policy)5.45
    (74) (beijing,chinese,reinsert)5.24
    (75) (beijing,chinese,prioritize)4.72
    (76) (chinese,leaders)4.51
    (77) (beijing,chinese,political)4.20
    (78) (beijing,chinese,policies)3.63
    (79) (chinese,communist_party)3.58
    (80) (beijing,global)2.80
    (81) (chinese,global)2.65
    (82) (beijing,chinese,pernicious)2.49
    (83) (chinese,citizens)2.13
    (84) (beijing,economic)0.93
    (85) (policy,weapons)0.83
    (86) (policy,waking)0.78
    (87) (policy,trump)0.73
    (88) (policy,state_department)0.67
    (89) (beijing,executive)0.16
    (90) (beijing,cities)0.16

    Complex Event Analysis - REPORT

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    Supporting narratives:

    • challenge (Read more)
      • Post-WTO accession, all trade-related regulations had to be offered for public comment and then openly published, giving the U.S. government a chance to beat back discriminatory rules and limiting Chinese officials from capriciously invoking vague laws against U.S. For the first time, non-Chinese companies located in China were granted the right to trade internationally and distribute those goods domestically within China, eliminating a previous requirement to use Chinese state-owned monopolies to conduct much of their operations
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,chinese,trade)
        • (china,trade)
        • (china,chinese,trade-related)
        • (chinese,trade)
        • Inferred entity relationships (19)
        • (china,trade,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,white_house) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,trade-related) [inferred]
        • (chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trading) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,society) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,xi_jinping) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,proclaim) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,security) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,state-owned) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,president_jiang_zemin) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,purges) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trumpsters) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • Post-WTO accession, all trade-related regulations had to be offered for public comment and then openly published, giving the U.S. government a chance to beat back discriminatory rules and limiting Chinese officials from capriciously invoking vague laws against U.S. For the first time, non-Chinese companies located in China were granted the right to trade internationally and distribute those goods domestically within China, eliminating a previous requirement to use Chinese state-owned monopolies to conduct much of their operations.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,chinese,state-owned)
        • Inferred entity relationships (12)
        • (china,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,trade-related) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,society) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,xi_jinping) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,proclaim) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,security) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,president_jiang_zemin) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,purges) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • I have decided I'm going to the Beijing Olympics, and I decided this because of the American athletes, I want to support them, but also because of my respect for the Chinese people and my respect for you." What was amazing is that Hu Jintao accepted that bargain.
        President Clinton used the state visit of President Jiang Zemin in 1997 to forthrightly proclaim that China was on the "wrong side of history" for the Tiananmen massacre.right in front of his Chinese counterpart at a live press conference
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,chinese,proclaim)
        • (china,chinese,president_jiang_zemin)
        • (american,china)
        • Inferred entity relationships (17)
        • (china,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (american,china,military) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,trade-related) [inferred]
        • (american,china,european) [inferred]
        • (american,china,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wanton) [inferred]
        • (american,china,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,society) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,xi_jinping) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,proclaim) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,security) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,state-owned) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,president_jiang_zemin) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,purges) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • In a piece lauding the Trump administration's China policy, Ambassador Robert Blackwill speculates that instituting tougher U.S. policy earlier would have tamed Beijing, but the details and time sequence of such an approach are left to the imagination.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (policy,tamed)
        • (beijing,china,policy)
        • (beijing,policy)
        • (china,policy,tamed)
        • (beijing,china,tamed)
        • Inferred entity relationships (23)
        • (beijing,china,trump) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,tamed) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,wariness) [inferred]
        • (china,policy) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,united_states) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,split) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,politics) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policies) [inferred]
        • (policy,tamed) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,survivability) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wmd) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tamed) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,non-ideological) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,soldiers) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,washington) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,state_bob_einhorn) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,technology) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,united_states) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • The safe money probably would have been against Beijing's adopting more pragmatic, non-ideological policies. That change did happen in foreign and domestic policy under Deng Xiaoping as China rebuilt its diplomatic relations with neighbors and former enemies
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,policies)
        • (beijing,china,policies)
        • (beijing,china,policy)
        • (beijing,china,non-ideological)
        • (china,policies)
        • Inferred entity relationships (23)
        • (beijing,china,trump) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,tamed) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,wariness) [inferred]
        • (china,policy) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,united_states) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,split) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,politics) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policies) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,survivability) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wmd) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tamed) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,non-ideological) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,soldiers) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,washington) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,state_bob_einhorn) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,technology) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,united_states) [inferred]
        • (china,policies) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • In a piece lauding the Trump administration's China policy, Ambassador Robert Blackwill speculates that instituting tougher U.S. policy earlier would have tamed Beijing, but the details and time sequence of such an approach are left to the imagination
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,china,trump)
        • (beijing,trump)
        • (china,policy,trump)
        • (china,trump)
        • Inferred entity relationships (22)
        • (beijing,china,tamed) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,wariness) [inferred]
        • (china,policy) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,united_states) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,split) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,politics) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policies) [inferred]
        • (policy,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,trump) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,survivability) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wmd) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tamed) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,non-ideological) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,soldiers) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,washington) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,state_bob_einhorn) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,technology) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,united_states) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • And the Paris Agreement, signed in 2016, reflects a Chinese policy in line with U.S. Put aside the politics over climate change in the United States in evaluating this effort with China. In the end, what mostly brought Beijing to the table was the toxic air choking major Chinese cities, which U.S. officials used to outline a clear U.S. policy goal (significant Chinese decreases in carbon emissions) combined with a bilateral and global diplomatic strategy (deploying the president, White House advisors, and senior diplomats) to bend Chinese policies to more align with the United States
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,united_states)
        • (beijing,china,politics)
        • (beijing,china,united_states)
        • (beijing,cities)
        • Inferred entity relationships (14)
        • (beijing,china) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,politics) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,tamed) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,politics,xi_jinping) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,non-ideological) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,wariness) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,washington) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,united_states) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,split) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,politics) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policies) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,survivability) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • He explained it this way: "Those of us who worked on China in the 1980s, particularly those of us who worked in connection with the Tiananmen massacre, never, ever lost our wariness about how to deal with China and never ever lost sight of what American interests were with regard to China." For American officials who were serving either in Beijing or Washington during the spring of 1989, the lesson they took away was that the Chinese Communist Party judged itself for mishandling the demonstrations due to a split in the top leadership.and that regime survivability at all costs would remain the Party's North Star
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,china,washington)
        • (beijing,china,wariness)
        • (beijing,china,split)
        • (american,china)
        • Inferred entity relationships (16)
        • (beijing,china) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,trump) [inferred]
        • (american,china,military) [inferred]
        • (american,china,european) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,tamed) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policy) [inferred]
        • (american,china,trump) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,non-ideological) [inferred]
        • (american,china,trade) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,wariness) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,washington) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,united_states) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,split) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,politics) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policies) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,survivability) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • He explained it this way: "Those of us who worked on China in the 1980s, particularly those of us who worked in connection with the Tiananmen massacre, never, ever lost our wariness about how to deal with China and never ever lost sight of what American interests were with regard to China." For American officials who were serving either in Beijing or Washington during the spring of 1989, the lesson they took away was that the Chinese Communist Party judged itself for mishandling the demonstrations due to a split in the top leadership.and that regime survivability at all costs would remain the Party's North Star.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,china,survivability)
        • Inferred entity relationships (11)
        • (beijing,china) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,trump) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,tamed) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policy) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,non-ideological) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,wariness) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,washington) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,united_states) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,split) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,politics) [inferred]
        • (beijing,china,policies) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • General Accounting Office summarized the situation in 2002: "We identified nearly 700 individual commitments on how China's trade regime will adhere to the organization's agreements, principles, and rules. Other commitments grant market access to other members'goods and services." China's accession package was based on early-1990s trade rules, and the global economy has evolved significantly since then
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,trade)
        • Inferred entity relationships (5)
        • (china,trade,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,white_house) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trading) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trumpsters) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • From the mid-1990s until 2018, I worked in number of different parts of the U.S. Government, including the White House National Security Council, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the State Department, and the U.S. In these positions, I worked on everything from China's disruptive foreign aid policies to Asia-Pacific regional architecture, from the Missile Technology Control Regime to discriminatory investment policies
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,policies)

    • challenge (Read more)
      • wealth and income inequality grew significantly from 1983 to 2016, with one group, not the Communist Party but the wealthiest U.S. This disparity is rightly not addressed in the halls of the WTO secretariat on Lake Geneva.
        A Way Forward
        For all of these examples, observers may argue that China would have adopted seemingly hard-won nonproliferation and economic liberalization policies without U.S. diplomacy, because they were in the self-interest of China's leaders
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,policies)

    • challenge (Read more)
      • The most celebrated cases, like South Korea's and South Africa's abandonment of nuclear weapons programs or Japan's pacifist constitution, owed to a special historical circumstance, a close alliance relationship, or a global coalition, none of which were present with China.
        One of the most vexing parts of the failed China strategy narrative is that critics cannot point to another course of action that would have led to a better outcome
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,global)
        • (policy,weapons)
        • (global,policy)

    • challenge (Read more)
      • As points of comparison, the U.S.'s alliance with Turkey and longstanding military ties to Egypt and Saudi Arabia have not let Washington dictate how those governments procure arms and address foreign and domestic threats
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,military)
        • Inferred entity relationships (10)
        • (china,military,separating) [inferred]
        • (china,military,twenty-first) [inferred]
        • (china,military,united_states) [inferred]
        • (china,military,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,military,threat) [inferred]
        • (china,military,western_pacific) [inferred]
        • (china,military,yield) [inferred]
        • (china,military,staff) [inferred]
        • (china,military,troops) [inferred]
        • (china,military,we_would_fight_china) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • On trade, restarting full-scale negotiations with the European Union and exploring options for joining the rebranded Trans-Pacific Partnership will put Beijing on notice that its current mercantilist policies are the outlier, not the norm.
        Some global and regional challenges such as financial stability, trade rules, disaster relief, and conflict mediation will require Chinese participation or acquiescence
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,trade)
        • (beijing,chinese,trans-pacific_partnership)
        • (beijing,policies)
        • (chinese,global)
        • (beijing,chinese,trade)
        • (beijing,chinese,policies)
        • (chinese,policies,trans-pacific_partnership)
        • (beijing,global)
        • (chinese,policies,trade)
        • (chinese,trade)
        • Inferred entity relationships (25)
        • (chinese,policies,state_mike_pompeo) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,summer) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wealth) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,religious) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,rules-based) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,technology) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,publicize) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,reinsert) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,political) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,wto) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,prioritize) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,united_states) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,pernicious) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trump) [inferred]
        • (policies,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,subvert) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wrongly) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • By cajoling and building pathways for PRC policies, U.S. officials over the last four decades were able to shape how Chinese leaders identified and pursued their interests and showed why aligning Chinese policies with those of the United States would be beneficial.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,policies,united_states)
        • (chinese,united_states)
        • Inferred entity relationships (11)
        • (chinese,policies,state_mike_pompeo) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,summer) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,religious) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,rules-based) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,subvert) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,technology) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,publicize) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,wto) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • We didn't publicize it because that wasn't a subject that we needed to in any way talk publicly about."
        Much more lethal than Chinese small arms finding their way into the Middle East in the 2000s were Chinese policies in the 1980s and 1990s that either encouraged or did not stem the flow of nuclear, chemical, and missile-related technology to U.S. adversaries or unstable regions.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,policies,technology)
        • Inferred entity relationships (12)
        • (chinese,policies,state_mike_pompeo) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,summer) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,united_states) [inferred]
        • (policies,technology) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,religious) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,rules-based) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,subvert) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,publicize) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,wto) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • Specific repugnant actions and confrontational policies, so the logic goes, underscore the true nature of the Chinese regime. As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pronounced at the Nixon Library earlier in the summer, "If we don't act now, ultimately the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] will erode our freedoms and subvert the rules-based order that our societies have worked so hard to build
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,policies,summer)
        • (chinese,policies,state_mike_pompeo)
        • Inferred entity relationships (12)
        • (chinese,policies,state_mike_pompeo) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,summer) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,united_states) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,religious) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,rules-based) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,subvert) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,technology) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,publicize) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,wto) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • Chinese government efforts at mass incarceration, targeted arrests for normal religious activities or press reporting, and an international campaign to cover up those repugnant policies need to see the light of day
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,policies,religious)
        • Inferred entity relationships (11)
        • (chinese,policies,state_mike_pompeo) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,summer) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,united_states) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,rules-based) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,subvert) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,technology) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,publicize) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,wto) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • We didn't publicize it because that wasn't a subject that we needed to in any way talk publicly about."
        Much more lethal than Chinese small arms finding their way into the Middle East in the 2000s were Chinese policies in the 1980s and 1990s that either encouraged or did not stem the flow of nuclear, chemical, and missile-related technology to U.S. adversaries or unstable regions
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,policies)
        • (chinese,policies,publicize)
        • Inferred entity relationships (11)
        • (chinese,policies,state_mike_pompeo) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,summer) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,united_states) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,religious) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,rules-based) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,subvert) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,technology) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,wto) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • On more than one occasion, I heard senior Trump administration officials lambast previous economic and trade dialogues as a cynical Chinese ploy to distract the U.S. government while Beijing went on to methodically build national wealth and power
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,trade)
        • (beijing,chinese,trump)
        • (beijing,chinese,trade)
        • (chinese,trade)
        • Inferred entity relationships (13)
        • (beijing,chinese,wealth) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,trump) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,prioritize) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,pernicious) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trump) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wrongly) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,reinsert) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,political) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • On more than one occasion, I heard senior Trump administration officials lambast previous economic and trade dialogues as a cynical Chinese ploy to distract the U.S. government while Beijing went on to methodically build national wealth and power.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,chinese,wealth)
        • Inferred entity relationships (10)
        • (beijing,chinese,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,prioritize) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wrongly) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,pernicious) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trump) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,reinsert) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,political) [inferred]

    • challenge (Read more)
      • At the time, Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji had made hard political choices in the interest of bringing international discipline to the domestic economy, and they would continue to do so by laying off over 40 million state workers (roughly a third of the total), opening up import and distribution rights, significantly lowering tariffs, and subjecting Chinese trade practices to WTO members'scrutiny.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,trade)
        • (chinese,wto)

    • challenge (Read more)
      • As the United States Trade Representative at the time, Robert Zoellick, told me, to say the United States made such an error is "just flat wrong." Nominal Chinese GDP was U.S.$1.3 trillion in 2001, compared to $14.1 trillion in 2019. At the time, Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji had made hard political choices in the interest of bringing international discipline to the domestic economy, and they would continue to do so by laying off over 40 million state workers (roughly a third of the total), opening up import and distribution rights, significantly lowering tariffs, and subjecting Chinese trade practices to WTO members'scrutiny
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,leaders)

    • challenge (Read more)
      • By cajoling and building pathways for PRC policies, U.S. officials over the last four decades were able to shape how Chinese leaders identified and pursued their interests and showed why aligning Chinese policies with those of the United States would be beneficial
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,leaders)

    • challenge (Read more)
      • The comfort, personal freedoms, and even dietary choices for hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens today have grown to levels unimaginable to their parents or grandparents. The lifting out of poverty did not lead to a more pluralistic political system, although Chinese citizens over the last two decades have been more active in civic life on everything from environmental stewardship to disaster relief
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,citizens)

    • challenge (Read more)
      • The most celebrated cases, like South Korea's and South Africa's abandonment of nuclear weapons programs or Japan's pacifist constitution, owed to a special historical circumstance, a close alliance relationship, or a global coalition, none of which were present with China.
        One of the most vexing parts of the failed China strategy narrative is that critics cannot point to another course of action that would have led to a better outcome. In a piece lauding the Trump administration's China policy, Ambassador Robert Blackwill speculates that instituting tougher U.S. policy earlier would have tamed Beijing, but the details and time sequence of such an approach are left to the imagination
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (policy,trump)

    • challenge (Read more)
      • That turbulent period brought a global financial crisis that discredited Wall Street, a U.S. military bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, an increasing reliance on the state for economic intervention, more assertive activities in the South China Sea, and a triumphal 2008 Beijing Olympics
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,global)
        • (beijing,economic)

    • challenge (Read more)
      • Yes, Xi Jinping's more recent drive to reinsert the Communist Party into daily life represents a pernicious trend, but that political tightening was neither foreordained nor proscribed by WTO entry.
        Critics also wrongly condemn the process for an outcome that was less than desired, as though somehow having U.S. officials meet with Chinese counterparts gave away U.S. leverage or bestowed some advantage to Beijing. On more than one occasion, I heard senior Trump administration officials lambast previous economic and trade dialogues as a cynical Chinese ploy to distract the U.S. government while Beijing went on to methodically build national wealth and power
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,economic)
        • (beijing,trump)

    • challenge (Read more)
      • Why was Russia's entering in the WTO in 2012 under a Putin-led oligarchy acceptable, and China's entry in 2001 led by no-nonsense Premier Zhu Rongji not. Blocking WTO entry would not have stopped Beijing in the 1990s from continuing down the path of economic liberalization. We should be cautious about imbuing too much authority or agency into a multilateral organization run by the member states
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,economic)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • The WTO, the report contended, was ill-equipped to deal with China's state capitalism and assertive economic policies. But using the Chinese economy of 2020 to judge the WTO accession protocol from two decades prior is another bit of historical revisionism.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,chinese,wto)
        • (chinese,policies,wto)
        • (chinese,wto)
        • Inferred entity relationships (24)
        • (chinese,policies,state_mike_pompeo) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,summer) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,policy) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,religious) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,rules-based) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,xi_jinping) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,proclaim) [inferred]
        • (chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,technology) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,state-owned) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,publicize) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,purges) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,trade-related) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wanton) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,united_states) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,society) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,subvert) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,security) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,president_jiang_zemin) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • No country would have joined a China containment effort in the 1990s or 2000s, and without allies such an approach would have been doomed to failure.
        The China We Have, Not the China We Want
        American officials who worked on China policy in the decades up to and after normalization in 1979 were acutely aware of the brutish methods of the CCP: the cult of personality surrounding Mao Zedong, the instability of leadership purges, the wanton destruction of life and society during the Cultural Revolution, the loyalty of the PLA to the CCP and not to the Chinese state evident on the streets around Tiananmen Square in June 1989
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,policy,wanton)
        • (china,chinese,wanton)
        • (china,chinese,purges)
        • (chinese,policy)
        • (china,chinese,society)
        • (chinese,society)
        • Inferred entity relationships (23)
        • (china,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (china,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,xi_jinping) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,proclaim) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,state-owned) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,purges) [inferred]
        • (chinese,society) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wmd) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,trade-related) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tamed) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,soldiers) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,society) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,state_bob_einhorn) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,security) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,president_jiang_zemin) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,technology) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,united_states) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • No country would have joined a China containment effort in the 1990s or 2000s, and without allies such an approach would have been doomed to failure.
        The China We Have, Not the China We Want
        American officials who worked on China policy in the decades up to and after normalization in 1979 were acutely aware of the brutish methods of the CCP: the cult of personality surrounding Mao Zedong, the instability of leadership purges, the wanton destruction of life and society during the Cultural Revolution, the loyalty of the PLA to the CCP and not to the Chinese state evident on the streets around Tiananmen Square in June 1989.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,chinese,policy)
        • (china,policy,tiananmen_square)
        • (china,chinese,tiananmen_square)
        • Inferred entity relationships (23)
        • (china,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (china,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,xi_jinping) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,proclaim) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,state-owned) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,purges) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wmd) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,trade-related) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tamed) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,soldiers) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,society) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,state_bob_einhorn) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,security) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,president_jiang_zemin) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,technology) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,united_states) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • As Winston Lord, aide to of State for East Asia, Ambassador to China, and President of the Council on Foreign Relations, told me: "Engagement is a tactic, not a strategy." Unfortunately, the term engagement has now lost any true meaning, an epithet hurled by critics to paint any diplomatic exchange or discussion as appeasement.
        For decades, U.S. leaders and policymakers realized the importance of building a working relationship with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to advance U.S. security interests in Asia.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,security)
        • (china,chinese,security)
        • Inferred entity relationships (12)
        • (china,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,trade-related) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,society) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,xi_jinping) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,proclaim) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,state-owned) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,president_jiang_zemin) [inferred]
        • (china,chinese,purges) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Chinese officials nicknamed Assistant Secretary of State Bob Einhorn "The Dentist" for his relentless pursuit of WMD technology proliferators; Einhorn spent a decade in the diplomatic trenches pushing to curb specific transactions and for changes in overall policy
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (policy,wmd)
        • (china,policy,state_bob_einhorn)
        • (china,policy,wmd)
        • (china,technology)
        • (policy,technology)
        • (china,policy,technology)
        • Inferred entity relationships (13)
        • (policy,wmd) [inferred]
        • (china,technology,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tamed) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,soldiers) [inferred]
        • (china,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,trump) [inferred]
        • (policy,technology) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,state_bob_einhorn) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,technology) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,united_states) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wmd) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Over the last two years, I have interviewed two dozen former U.S. officials about how they handled a rising China, how they assessed U.S. interests, and what they saw as lessons for future generations of officials, soldiers, and negotiators for an oral history podcast aimed at guiding the United States'approach to dealing with China going forward.
        False Narratives
        Critics of the last four decades of China policy have incorrectly and simplistically labeled diplomacy a failure because the People's Republic did not become a liberal democracy
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,policy,united_states)
        • (chinese,policy)
        • (chinese,united_states)
        • (policy,united_states)
        • (china,policy,soldiers)
        • Inferred entity relationships (11)
        • (china,policy,tiananmen_square) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,tamed) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,soldiers) [inferred]
        • (china,policy) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,trump) [inferred]
        • (policy,united_states) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wanton) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,state_bob_einhorn) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,technology) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,united_states) [inferred]
        • (china,policy,wmd) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • It's their region." While Beijing's overall implementation of nonproliferation rules has not been perfect, U.S. forces and allies are today safer with China inside the tent than if the workshop of the world had been left outside.
        Before the coronavirus outbreak and events in Hong Kong grabbed the headlines over the last few months, the Trump administration spent the better part of three years decrying China's "unfair" and "not reciprocal" trade practices.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,trade)
        • Inferred entity relationships (5)
        • (china,trade,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,white_house) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trading) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trumpsters) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Drawing on the experiences of the two dozen former officials I interviewed, and on my own review of the history of U.S.-China relations since Nixon's 1972 visit, here are the potential building blocks of a U.S. strategy towards China for the coming decades.
        U.S. security and prosperity is enhanced with strong military alliances and trade partnerships, none more so than in the Asia-Pacific.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,trade)
        • (china,military)
        • Inferred entity relationships (15)
        • (china,trade,trump) [inferred]
        • (china,military,twenty-first) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,white_house) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trading) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (china,military,separating) [inferred]
        • (china,military,united_states) [inferred]
        • (china,military,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,military,threat) [inferred]
        • (china,military,western_pacific) [inferred]
        • (china,military,yield) [inferred]
        • (china,military,staff) [inferred]
        • (china,military,troops) [inferred]
        • (china,military,we_would_fight_china) [inferred]
        • (china,trade,trumpsters) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • The WTO, the report contended, was ill-equipped to deal with China's state capitalism and assertive economic policies. But using the Chinese economy of 2020 to judge the WTO accession protocol from two decades prior is another bit of historical revisionism
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,policies)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Drawing on the experiences of the two dozen former officials I interviewed, and on my own review of the history of U.S.-China relations since Nixon's 1972 visit, here are the potential building blocks of a U.S. strategy towards China for the coming decades.
        U.S. security and prosperity is enhanced with strong military alliances and trade partnerships, none more so than in the Asia-Pacific
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,security)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Other commitments grant market access to other members'goods and services." China's accession package was based on early-1990s trade rules, and the global economy has evolved significantly since then.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,global)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • As chief climate negotiator Todd Stern told me, the administration identified early in its tenure the goal of addressing climate change and that China, as the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter, would have to be brought in for a global agreement to work.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,global)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • It's their region." While Beijing's overall implementation of nonproliferation rules has not been perfect, U.S. forces and allies are today safer with China inside the tent than if the workshop of the world had been left outside.
        Before the coronavirus outbreak and events in Hong Kong grabbed the headlines over the last few months, the Trump administration spent the better part of three years decrying China's "unfair" and "not reciprocal" trade practices
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,trump)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • does not, as [the Trump] administration does not, we're leaving the door open for China to be a Rule Maker with a capital R and a capital M. If we're at the table, and we're involved, and we're putting forward serious proposals, then they are naturally going to get traction with others
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,trump)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Telecommunications and semiconductors are two sectors rightly receiving special U.S. Government scrutiny given the reliance of military systems on those networks and technologies.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (china,military)
        • Inferred entity relationships (10)
        • (china,military,separating) [inferred]
        • (china,military,twenty-first) [inferred]
        • (china,military,united_states) [inferred]
        • (china,military,trade) [inferred]
        • (china,military,threat) [inferred]
        • (china,military,western_pacific) [inferred]
        • (china,military,yield) [inferred]
        • (china,military,staff) [inferred]
        • (china,military,troops) [inferred]
        • (china,military,we_would_fight_china) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • The very public purge was a stark reminder to American officials of the capriciousness and ideological dangers of the CCP.
        There was no inevitability about China joining international institutions given the track-record of the first three decades of Communist rule
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (american,china)
        • Inferred entity relationships (4)
        • (american,china,military) [inferred]
        • (american,china,european) [inferred]
        • (american,china,trump) [inferred]
        • (american,china,trade) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pronounced at the Nixon Library earlier in the summer, "If we don't act now, ultimately the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] will erode our freedoms and subvert the rules-based order that our societies have worked so hard to build.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,policies,subvert)
        • (chinese,policies,rules-based)
        • Inferred entity relationships (12)
        • (chinese,policies,state_mike_pompeo) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trade) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,summer) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,united_states) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,religious) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,rules-based) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,subvert) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,technology) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,publicize) [inferred]
        • (chinese,policies,wto) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Yes, Xi Jinping's more recent drive to reinsert the Communist Party into daily life represents a pernicious trend, but that political tightening was neither foreordained nor proscribed by WTO entry.
        Critics also wrongly condemn the process for an outcome that was less than desired, as though somehow having U.S. officials meet with Chinese counterparts gave away U.S. leverage or bestowed some advantage to Beijing
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,chinese,reinsert)
        • (beijing,chinese,pernicious)
        • (chinese,wto)
        • (beijing,chinese,wrongly)
        • (beijing,wto)
        • (beijing,chinese,wto)
        • (beijing,chinese,political)
        • Inferred entity relationships (12)
        • (beijing,chinese,wealth) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,prioritize) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,pernicious) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trump) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wrongly) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,reinsert) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,political) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • needs to prioritize our strategic goals, where there are overlapping interests with Beijing, and work towards coordination in both private and public messaging
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,chinese,prioritize)
        • Inferred entity relationships (10)
        • (beijing,chinese,trans-pacific_partnership) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wealth) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wto) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,policies) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trade) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,wrongly) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,pernicious) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,trump) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,reinsert) [inferred]
        • (beijing,chinese,political) [inferred]

    • WIP (Read more)
      • At the presidential and the negotiator level, and every level in between, the U.S. pushed for Chinese action on climate both for a change in domestic policy to slow emissions and to break away from a long-held Non-Aligned stance (that is, that rich countries are to blame and should fix climate change)
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,policy)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • And when individuals have the power, not just to dream but to realize their dreams, they will demand a greater say.
        That wealth creation did occur, and Chinese citizens are now able to control more parts of their lives than they were throughout most of the 20th century: Per capita GDP jumped from U.S.$1,000 in 2000 to almost $10,000 by 2019, 90% of Chinese citizens now own their own homes, and since WTO accession Chinese outbound overseas trips jumped from 10 million to over 150 million visits last year
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,wto)
        • (chinese,citizens)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Many of the former U.S. officials I interviewed point to 2006-2010 as the years during which the Chinese leadership grew increasingly dismissive of the United States and confident in using Communist Party and central government tools to extend power and influence at home and abroad
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,united_states)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • As Winston Lord, aide to of State for East Asia, Ambassador to China, and President of the Council on Foreign Relations, told me: "Engagement is a tactic, not a strategy." Unfortunately, the term engagement has now lost any true meaning, an epithet hurled by critics to paint any diplomatic exchange or discussion as appeasement.
        For decades, U.S. leaders and policymakers realized the importance of building a working relationship with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to advance U.S. security interests in Asia
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,leaders)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • These examples of U.S. presidents'raising some of the Party's darkest episodes undercut the assertion that U.S. officials were unaware, ignorant, or disinterested in the repressive nature of the CCP.
        In the final assessment of administration after administration, the U.S. global agenda since the 1970s.prevailing in the Cold War, increasing prosperity at home and among friends and allies, reducing threats to the American people.argued for working with the Chinese government
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,global)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pronounced at the Nixon Library earlier in the summer, "If we don't act now, ultimately the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] will erode our freedoms and subvert the rules-based order that our societies have worked so hard to build
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,communist_party)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • It is a modern society grappling with issues around family expectations, spirituality, sexuality, personal choice.topics and issues off-limits to previous generations of Chinese individuals. Yes, Xi Jinping's more recent drive to reinsert the Communist Party into daily life represents a pernicious trend, but that political tightening was neither foreordained nor proscribed by WTO entry.
        Critics also wrongly condemn the process for an outcome that was less than desired, as though somehow having U.S. officials meet with Chinese counterparts gave away U.S. leverage or bestowed some advantage to Beijing
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,communist_party)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Many of the former U.S. officials I interviewed point to 2006-2010 as the years during which the Chinese leadership grew increasingly dismissive of the United States and confident in using Communist Party and central government tools to extend power and influence at home and abroad.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (chinese,communist_party)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Targeted financial sanctions on individual officials and institutions can be an effective tool if the intelligence record is clear on culpability.
        And speaking out on these issues will remain important as part of a broader, completely revamped public diplomacy policy. American technology platforms are finally waking up to regulating state-sponsored speech. To undercut false authoritarian narratives, the U.S. Government needs the right mix of regulating online commercial activities to protect consumers'rights and working with platforms to promote a healthy global debate.
        Finally, the U.S. will have to remain flexible on areas where international rules and norms remain under development
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (policy,technology)
        • (policy,waking)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • While Beijing's own choices have largely driven a need for a coordinated global response, the move to a more confrontational U.S. approach often rests in part on a critique of the past four decades of U.S. policy towards the People's Republic of China (PRC), a criticism broken down into three intertwined elements
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (global,policy)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • The most visible event around that shift was General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's 1989 visit to Beijing, ending two decades of hostilities between Communist giants.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,policy)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • Having frameworks for senior policy discussions and for presidents to meet were not just for talk's sake, but regularly provided the mechanisms to advance U.S. For example, in the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003, I was serving on the State Department's China desk when a senior PRC official essentially told his U.S. counterpart: "Saddam is no friend of ours
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (policy,state_department)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • One of the most troublesome foreign policies Beijing embraced coming out of the Mao era was a nonchalance towards global nonproliferation treaties, rules, and norms
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,policies)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • One of the most troublesome foreign policies Beijing embraced coming out of the Mao era was a nonchalance towards global nonproliferation treaties, rules, and norms.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,global)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • needs to prioritize our strategic goals, where there are overlapping interests with Beijing, and work towards coordination in both private and public messaging. The Obama administration's ability to bring global consensus on climate change, even under strongman Xi Jinping, demonstrates what is possible.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,global)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • The executive branch should work with Congress for additional authorities beyond existing executive orders
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,executive)

    • WIP (Read more)
      • For American officials on the ground in Beijing, the massive protests in Beijing and dozens of other cities provided a window on how violently the CCP would handle dissent.
      • High Level Abstractions:
        • (beijing,cities)

    Target rule match count: 119.0 Challenge: 0.29 Momentum: 0.00 WIP: 0.21