Indeed, Supreme Court's determination that non-party entities should pay the ultimate price without ever having a day in court and in the absence of any public threat, consumer-directed conduct, or actual, or even alleged, harm to the public or anyone else, plainly violates the Executive Law's prescription that cancellation be applied as a remedy only in "appropriate cases," doles out corporate death sentences that the Executive Law does not authorize in any respect, and is without precedent in this State ...
This Court, in affirming Supreme Court in its entirety, likewise characterized the relief sought as follows: "[t]he State brought this special proceeding against respondents under Executive Law 63(12) for engaging in repeated and persistent fraud and under Business Corporation Law (BCL) 1102(a)(2) to have Northern Leasing System dissolved." 193 A.D.3d at 72 ...
The First Department Decision holds that the Attorney General's claims "accrued" when "transactions were completed." Supreme Court suggests that this Court's use of "completed" rather than "closed" indicates that it rejected Appellants (and Ms ...
The decretal paragraph of the First Department Decision makes clear this Court did not affirm Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Supreme Court defiantly declared in the MSJ Decision that this Court "declined to dismiss...any causes of action." Robert Aff., Ex. ...
Compounding the injustices imposed by the MSJ Decision, Supreme Court also directed the parties to proceed to trial on claims this Court dismissed as time-barred several months ago, claims over which Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction ...
That Supreme Court has, sua sponte, ordered the immediate cancellation of the business licenses and dissolution of the entity Appellants without any statutory authority in and of itself warrants a stay ...
topNonetheless, Supreme Court failed to even acknowledge the First Department Decision for months, forcing Appellants to relitigate the issues.
topThe First Department Decision holds that the Attorney General's claims "accrued" when "transactions were completed." Supreme Court suggests that this Court's use of "completed" rather than "closed"...
topThat Supreme Court has, sua sponte, ordered the immediate cancellation of the business licenses and dissolution of the entity Appellants without any statutory authority in and of itself warrants a stay
topThat Supreme Court has, sua sponte, ordered the immediate cancellation of the business licenses and dissolution of the entity Appellants without any statutory authority in and of itself warrants a stay
top... has decided that Appellants are liable because the individuals "repeatedly submitted fraudulent financial documents to obtain financial benefits which otherwise they would not have received." Robert Aff., Ex.
topBased upon this glaring fallacy and its inexplicable invocation of the very same continuing wrong doctrine this Court said was patently inapplicable, Supreme Court refused to dismiss a single claim. Instead of complying immediately with a binding directive from this Court, Supreme Court required Appellants to re-litigate the previously...
top... claim, any prior request for such relief, or notice that it was considering granting such relief is an egregious violation of Appellants'due process rights and in clear excess of Supreme Court's lawful jurisdiction.
topBased upon this glaring fallacy and its inexplicable invocation of the very same continuing wrong doctrine this Court said was patently inapplicable, Supreme Court refused to dismiss a single claim
topBased upon this glaring fallacy and its inexplicable invocation of the very same continuing wrong doctrine this Court said was patently inapplicable, Supreme Court refused to dismiss a single claim
topThis Court unequivocally required Supreme Court to dismiss certain claims upon remand. Nonetheless, Supreme Court failed to even acknowledge the First Department Decision for months, forcing Appellants to relitigate the issues
topThe decretal paragraph of the First Department Decision makes clear this Court did not affirm Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Supreme Court defiantly declared in the MSJ Decision that this Court "declined to dismiss...any causes of action." Robert Aff., Ex.
topSupreme Court's citations, including to one of the cases cited in the First Department Decision, make clear that Supreme Court believes it may cherry-pick portions of the doctrine to sustain dismissed claims despite this Court's ruling.
topThe First Department Decision holds that the Attorney General's claims "accrued" when "transactions were completed." Supreme Court suggests that this Court's use of "completed" rather than "closed" indicates that it rejected Appellants...
topThe decretal paragraph of the First Department Decision makes clear this Court did not affirm Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Supreme Court defiantly declared in the MSJ Decision that this Court "declined to dismiss...any causes of action." Robert Aff., Ex
top... asked Supreme Court whether the entities owning assets in real property such as Trump Tower and 40 Wall Street "are now going to be sold" or "managed under the direction of the monitor or whomever we appoint for this process." Robert Aff., Ex.
topSpecifically, counsel asked Supreme Court whether the entities owning assets in real property such as Trump Tower and 40 Wall Street "are now going to be sold" or "managed under the direction of the monitor or whomever we appoint for this process." Robert Aff., Ex
topSpecifically, counsel asked Supreme Court whether the entities owning assets in real property such as Trump Tower and 40 Wall Street "are now going to be sold" or "managed under the direction of the monitor or whomever we appoint for this process." Robert Aff., Ex
topHere, Supreme Court has decided that Appellants are liable because the individuals "repeatedly submitted fraudulent financial documents to obtain financial benefits which otherwise they would not have received." Robert Aff., Ex
top... ultimate price without ever having a day in court and in the absence of any public threat, consumer-directed conduct, or actual, or even alleged, harm to the public or anyone else, plainly violates the Executive Law's prescription that cancellation be applied as a remedy only in "appropriate cases," doles out corporate death sentences that the Executive Law does not authorize in any respect, and is without...
topIndeed, Supreme Court's determination that non-party entities should pay the ultimate price without ever having a day in court and in the absence of any public threat, consumer-directed conduct, or actual, or even alleged, harm to the public or anyone else, plainly violates the Executive Law's prescription that cancellation be applied as a remedy only in "appropriate...
top... of any public threat, consumer-directed conduct, or actual, or even alleged, harm to the public or anyone else, plainly violates the Executive Law's prescription that cancellation be applied as a remedy only in "appropriate cases," doles out corporate death sentences that the Executive Law does not authorize in any respect, and is without precedent in this State
top... conduct, or actual, or even alleged, harm to the public or anyone else, plainly violates the Executive Law's prescription that cancellation be applied as a remedy only in "appropriate cases," doles out corporate death sentences that the Executive Law does not authorize in any respect, and is without precedent in this State
top... actual, or even alleged, harm to the public or anyone else, plainly violates the Executive Law's prescription that cancellation be applied as a remedy only in "appropriate cases," doles out corporate death sentences that the Executive Law does not authorize in any respect, and is without precedent in this State
topIndeed, Supreme Court's determination that non-party entities should pay the ultimate price without ever having a day in court and in the absence of any public threat, consumer-directed conduct, or actual, or even alleged, harm to the public or anyone else, plainly violates the Executive Law's prescription that cancellation be applied as a remedy only in "appropriate cases,"...
topThis Court, in affirming Supreme Court in its entirety, likewise characterized the relief sought as follows: "[t]he State brought this special proceeding against respondents under Executive Law 63(12) for engaging in repeated and persistent fraud and under Business Corporation Law (BCL) 1102(a)(2) to have Northern Leasing System dissolved." 193 A.D.3d at 72
top... dismiss any of the Attorney General's claims because all of the loan transactions, no matter when entered, entailed continuing contractual obligations to submit annual certification of the original SFCs.
topTrump's motions to dismiss, Supreme Court likewise invoked the continuing wrong doctrine to explain why it believed the Attorney General's claims could be sustained against Ms
topThus, Supreme Court justified its refusal to dismiss any of the Attorney General's claims because all of the loan transactions, no matter when entered, entailed continuing contractual obligations to submit annual certification of the original SFCs
topThus, Supreme Court justified its refusal to dismiss any of the Attorney General's claims because all of the loan transactions, no matter when entered, entailed continuing contractual obligations to submit annual certification of the original SFCs.
top... Supreme Court justified its refusal to dismiss any of the Attorney General's claims because all of the loan transactions, no matter when entered, entailed continuing contractual obligations to submit annual certification of the original SFCs.
top... Attorney General's claims "accrued" when "transactions were completed." Supreme Court suggests that this Court's use of "completed" rather than "closed" indicates that it rejected Appellants (and Ms.
topFor defendants bound by the tolling agreement, claims are untimely if they accrued before July 13, 2014.. Id. The Court then "le[ft to] Supreme Court to determine, if necessary, the full range of defendants bound by the tolling agreement."...
top... Law 63(12) only authorizes a Court to grant "the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper." There is simply no statutory basis for Supreme Court to grant non-requested relief sua sponte.
top... 63(12) only authorizes a Court to grant "the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper." There is simply no statutory basis for Supreme Court to grant non-requested relief sua sponte.
topPerhaps worst of all, it seeks to impose the corporate death penalty with no statutory authority for such remedy.. . Exacerbating Supreme Court's plain error is the fact that this Court unequivocally dismissed many of the claims upon which Supreme Court has now adjudicated liability and granted permanent relief
topCompounding the injustices imposed by the MSJ Decision, Supreme Court also directed the parties to proceed to trial on claims this Court dismissed as time-barred several months ago, claims over which Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction
topOliver Schools, the Attorney General specifically commenced an action for dissolution pursuant to Article 11 of the BCL, and the Court granted relief exclusively on that basis, with no reference at all to Executive Law 63(12)
topLeasing Systems, the Attorney General brought two distinct causes of action: one under Executive Law 63(12) for "fraud" and one under BCL 1101(a)(2) for "dissolution." Index No.
topBCL 1101, not the Executive Law, empowers the Attorney General to seek judicial dissolution of a corporate entity, but the Attorney General's 838-paragraph complaint contains no reference to Article 11 of the BCL or dissolution
topThe Expansive Injunctive Relief Granted is Not Authorized by the Executive Law. Supreme Court granted permanent injunctive relief to the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Law 63(12), which provides, in relevant part:.
topSupreme Court's grant of broad, un-demanded relief, without notice it was considering doing so and or an opportunity for Appellants to oppose it, severely prejudices Appellants, especially those against whom the Attorney General never sought cancellation and is patently improper and unconstitutional
topTrump's motions to dismiss, Supreme Court likewise invoked the continuing wrong doctrine to explain why it believed the Attorney General's claims could be sustained against Ms. Trump.12 This Court disagreed.. . In unanimously modifying Supreme Court's decision, this Court assessed and rejected the argument that annual certifications themselves could support the timeliness of the...
top... relies on claims and transactions unquestionably outside of the statutory period in granting expansive injunctive relief: "Although any liability arising out of the submission of the 2011 and 2012 SFCs is time barred; as previously discussed, these submissions may be considered as evidence in support of [the Attorney General]'s request for injunctive relief." Robert Aff., Ex
top... submission of the 2011 and 2012 SFCs is time barred; as previously discussed, these submissions may be considered as evidence in support of [the Attorney General]'s request for injunctive relief." Robert Aff., Ex.
top... the record was sufficiently clear that she was not subject to the tolling agreement and the Attorney General's allegations did "not support any claims that accrued after February 6, 2016." Robert Aff., Ex.
topSupreme Court's application of such punitive relief to remedy purported misconduct outside the statutory period, to non-parties, in the absence of a request from the Attorney General, and without statutory authority also violates the LOTC and bedrock principles of due process and fundamental fairness
topExecutive Law 63(12) begins with a focus on a specific "person," i.e., the subject of an action commenced by the Attorney General, not unnamed non-parties.
topThe relief far exceeds what the Attorney General asked for in her complaint and/or in her summary judgment motion. Executive Law 63(12) only authorizes a Court to grant "the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper." There is simply no statutory basis for Supreme Court to grant non-requested relief...
topFinally, in People v. Saskniit, the Court stated that "[t]he Attorney General has brought an action to dissolve the corporate defendant and to enjoin all defendants from engaging in certain allegedly fraudulent acts (Exec
top... Court has openly stated that it considered all evidence, including conduct it concedes cannot form the basis of any timely claim, in granting the Attorney General injunctive relief that is overbroad, unrequested, and unauthorized.
top... that Appellants are liable under Executive Law 63(12) for "persistent and repeated fraud" arising from loan transactions outside of the statutory limitations period contravenes this Court's unanimous June 27, 2023, decision (the "First Department Decision").
top... summarily cancelled the business certificates of party and non-party entities operating lawful businesses in the State based on its finding that the international commercial banks with which Appellants transacted should have made more than the hundreds of millions of dollars Appellants paid them under the subject loan agreements
topSupreme Court summarily cancelled the business certificates of party and non-party entities operating lawful businesses in the State based on its finding that the international commercial banks with which Appellants transacted should have made more than the hundreds of millions of dollars Appellants...
topSupreme Court summarily cancelled the business certificates of party and non-party entities operating lawful businesses in the State based on its finding that the international commercial banks with which Appellants transacted should have made more than the hundreds of millions of...
topSupreme Court summarily cancelled the business certificates of party and non-party entities operating lawful businesses in the State based on its finding that the international commercial banks with which Appellants transacted should have made more than the hundreds of millions of dollars Appellants paid them...
topSupreme Court's finding that Appellants are liable under Executive Law 63(12) for "persistent and repeated fraud" arising from loan transactions outside of the statutory limitations period contravenes this Court's unanimous June 27, 2023, decision (the "First...
top... non-party entities operating lawful businesses in the State based on its finding that the international commercial banks with which Appellants transacted should have made more than the hundreds of millions of dollars Appellants paid them under the subject loan agreements.
topTrump based on Deutsche Bank loan transactions entered into in 2011, with terms extending past 2022, wherein Appellants were obligated to submit annual certifications
top... 63(12) for "persistent and repeated fraud" arising from loan transactions outside of the statutory limitations period contravenes this Court's unanimous June 27, 2023, decision (the "First Department Decision").
topSupreme Court's finding that Appellants are liable under Executive Law 63(12) for "persistent and repeated fraud" arising from loan transactions outside of the statutory limitations period contravenes this Court's unanimous June 27, 2023, decision (the "First Department Decision")
topBy rejecting the continuing wrong doctrine in this case, the Court concluded that Appellants'submissions of purported "separate fraudulent SFC[s]" pursuant to time-barred contracts were not separate, fraudulent acts at all.
top... Seng, 177 AD3d 463, 464 (1st Dept 2019) (finding continuous series of wrongs each of which gave rise to its own claim)." Id. at 17.. . Supreme Court derides Appellants'argument for dismissal of time-barred claims as demanding that it "apply a bizarre, invented, inverted form of the 'relation back'doctrine." Id
topat 3 (emphasis added)), and (3) "any SFC that was submitted after July 13, 2014, falls within the applicable statute of limitations" because each is "a distinct fraudulent act," (id
topBy rejecting the continuing wrong doctrine in this case, the Court concluded that Appellants'submissions of purported "separate fraudulent SFC[s]" pursuant to time-barred contracts were not separate, fraudulent acts at all.
top... notice it was considering doing so and or an opportunity for Appellants to oppose it, severely prejudices Appellants, especially those against whom the Attorney General never sought cancellation and is patently improper and unconstitutional.
top. Supreme Court's decision will unquestionably inflict severe and irreparable harm not only to Appellants but to innocent nonparties and employees who depend on the affected entities for their livelihoods
topSupreme Court's grant of broad, un-demanded relief, without notice it was considering doing so and or an opportunity for Appellants to oppose it, severely prejudices Appellants, especially those against whom the Attorney General never sought cancellation...
topTherapeutic Hypnosis, Inc, the proceeding was brought pursuant to, inter alia, BCL 1101(a)(1), (a)(2), and the Court "order[ed] dissolution of THI [pursuant to] (s 63(12) of Executive Law; sections 1101(a)(1), (2) and 109(a)(5) of the Business Corporation Law)."...
top1962) ("The jurisdiction of the court with respect to an action for the dissolution of a corporation under the circumstances is derived solely from the statute and unless the complaint shows the jurisdictional facts the court has no power to act.").
top... "[t]he State brought this special proceeding against respondents under Executive Law 63(12) for engaging in repeated and persistent fraud and under Business Corporation Law (BCL) 1102(a)(2) to have Northern Leasing System dissolved." 193 A.D.3d at 72.
topIndeed, Supreme Court's determination that non-party entities should pay the ultimate price without ever having a day in court and in the absence of any public threat, consumer-directed conduct, or actual, or even alleged, harm to the public or anyone...
topSupreme Court's finding that Appellants are liable under Executive Law 63(12) for "persistent and repeated fraud" arising from loan transactions outside of the statutory limitations period contravenes this Court's unanimous June 27, 2023, decision (the "First Department Decision")
topFinally, Supreme Court's election to order the dissolution of non-party entities, over which Supreme Court has no jurisdiction, is impermissible
top... 107 A.D.3d 976, 977 (2d Dep't 2013) ("A court has no power to grant relief against an entity not named as a party and not properly summoned before the court.") Since the entities affected by Supreme Court's permanent injunction have never been properly summoned before the court, Supreme Court has no power to award any relief against them
top... "bind[s] a trial court (and subsequent appellate courts of coordinate jurisdiction) to follow the mandate of an appellate court, absent new evidence or a change in the law." Matter of Part 60 RMBS Put-Back Litig., 195 A.D.3d 40, 48 (1st Dep't 2021) (Gische, J.S.C.); see also, e.g., Applehole v
top"[N]o discretion [is] involved; the lower court must apply the rule laid down by the appellate court." Matter of Part 60 RMBS Put-Back Litig., 195 A.D.3d at 48 (quoting People v.
topBy rejecting the continuing wrong doctrine in this case, the Court concluded that Appellants'submissions of purported "separate fraudulent SFC[s]" pursuant to time-barred contracts were not separate, fraudulent acts at all.
topUnder a general prayer for relief upon a motion every possible relief should not be granted, but it should be allied to what is asked for, and not entirely distinct therefrom."); see also Datwani v. Datwani, 102 A.D.3d 616 (1st Dep't 2013) ("It was error for the IAS court to sua sponte impose a stay of this action, as no party requested that relief, and defendant, who would have benefited...
topFinally, Supreme Court's election to order the dissolution of non-party entities, over which Supreme Court has no jurisdiction, is impermissible. Weiner, 107 A.D.3d 976, 977 (2d Dep't 2013) ("A court has no power to grant relief against an entity not named as a party and not properly summoned before the court.") Since the entities affected...
topUnder a general prayer for relief upon a motion every possible relief should not be granted, but it should be allied to what is asked for, and not entirely distinct therefrom."); see also Datwani v. Datwani, 102 A.D.3d 616 (1st Dep't 2013) ("It was error for the IAS court to sua sponte impose a stay of this action, as no party requested that relief, and defendant, who...
topDepartment of Health Servs. of County of Suffolk, 220 A.D.2d 13, 15 (2d Dep't 1996). Additionally, this Court retains broad inherent authority to grant a general discretionary stay of any proceedings in the underlying action in order to prevent...
top... granted, but it should be allied to what is asked for, and not entirely distinct therefrom."); see also Datwani v. Datwani, 102 A.D.3d 616 (1st Dep't 2013) ("It was error for the IAS court to sua sponte impose a stay of this action, as no party requested that relief, and defendant, who would have benefited from the stay, did not even make a motion, cross motion or other application for relief.")
topSupreme Court's wholesale grant of dissolution by fiat absent a BCL 1101 claim, any prior request for such relief, or notice that it was considering granting such relief is an egregious violation of Appellants'due process rights and in clear excess of Supreme Court's lawful jurisdiction.
top... absent a BCL 1101 claim, any prior request for such relief, or notice that it was considering granting such relief is an egregious violation of Appellants'due process rights and in clear excess of Supreme Court's lawful jurisdiction.
topAppellants and the affected nonparties also had no ability to defend against a remedy that has never been mentioned in this action. Supreme Court's wholesale grant of dissolution by fiat absent a BCL 1101 claim, any prior request for such relief, or notice that it was considering...
topSupreme Court cannot convert the Attorney General's action on its own initiative.3 Moreover, BCL 1101 does not apply to LLCs, and the Limited Liability Company Law has no provision authorizing the Attorney General to seek dissolution
topSupreme Court cannot convert the Attorney General's action on its own initiative.3 Moreover, BCL 1101 does not apply to LLCs, and the Limited Liability Company Law has no provision authorizing the Attorney General to seek dissolution
top... statute of limitations and the appropriate tolling, claims are time barred if they accrued that is, the transactions were completed before February 6, 2016 (see Boesky v Levine, 193 AD3d 403, 405 [lst Dept 2021]; Rogal v Wechsler, 135 AD2d 384, 385 [1st Dept 1987]).
top... limitations and the appropriate tolling, claims are time barred if they accrued that is, the transactions were completed before February 6, 2016 (see Boesky v Levine, 193 AD3d 403, 405 [lst Dept 2021]; Rogal v Wechsler, 135 AD2d 384, 385 [1st Dept 1987]).
topFor defendants bound by the tolling agreement, claims are untimely if they accrued before July 13, 2014.. Id. The Court then "le[ft to] Supreme Court to determine, if necessary, the full range of defendants bound by the tolling agreement." Id
topFor defendants bound by the tolling agreement, claims are untimely if they accrued before July 13, 2014.. Id. The Court then "le[ft to] Supreme Court to determine, if necessary, the full range of defendants bound by the tolling agreement." Id
top... limitations and the appropriate tolling, claims are time barred if they accrued that is, the transactions were completed before February 6, 2016 (see Boesky v Levine, 193 AD3d 403, 405 [lst Dept 2021]; Rogal v Wechsler, 135 AD2d 384, 385 [1st Dept 1987]).
topEngoron, J.), entered January 9, 2023, which denied defendants'respective motions to dismiss the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to dismiss, as time barred, the claims against defendant Ivanka Trump and the claims against the remaining defendants to the extent they accrued...
topEngoron, J.), entered January 9, 2023, which denied defendants'respective motions to dismiss the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to dismiss, as time barred, the claims against defendant Ivanka Trump and the claims against the remaining defendants to the extent they accrued prior to July 2014 (with respect to those defendants subject to the August 2021 tolling agreement) and February 2016 (with respect...
topApplying the proper statute of limitations and the appropriate tolling, claims are time barred if they accrued that is, the transactions were completed before February 6, 2016 (see Boesky v Levine, 193 AD3d 403, 405 [lst Dept 2021]; Rogal v Wechsler, 135 AD2d 384, 385 [1st Dept 1987])
topTrump because the record was sufficiently clear that she was not subject to the tolling agreement and the Attorney General's allegations did "not support any claims that accrued after February 6, 2016." Robert Aff., Ex
topCompounding the injustices imposed by the MSJ Decision, Supreme Court also directed the parties to proceed to trial on claims this Court dismissed as time-barred several months ago, claims over which Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction.
topIn a simple declaratory sentence, the Court thus concluded that the Attorney General's claims are time-barred insofar as they are premised on transactions completed outside of the applicable statutory periods: "The continuing wrong doctrine does not delay or extend these periods (see CWCapital Cobalt VR Ltd
topSupreme Court effectively imposes liability on claims it admits are time-barred and, in doing so, nullifies the entire concept of a statutory period.
topBased on this clear ruling, eight of the ten lending-based claims in the Complaint are time-barred.. . This Court's determination is law of the case ("LOTC"). LOTC "bind[s] a trial court (and subsequent appellate courts of coordinate jurisdiction) to follow the mandate of an appellate court, absent new evidence or a change in the law." Matter of Part 60...
topSupreme Court effectively imposes liability on claims it admits are time-barred and, in doing so, nullifies the entire concept of a statutory period
topIn a simple declaratory sentence, the Court thus concluded that the Attorney General's claims are time-barred insofar as they are premised on transactions completed outside of the applicable statutory periods: "The continuing wrong doctrine does not delay or extend these periods (see CWCapital Cobalt VR Ltd
topTerminating non-party business licenses without jurisdiction, without process, without statutory authority, without trial, and without reason renders impossible the lawful operation of multiple businesses and threatens termination of hundreds of New York employees without any jurisdiction or due process
topSupreme Court summarily cancelled the business certificates of party and non-party entities operating lawful businesses in the State based on its finding that the international commercial banks with which Appellants transacted should have made more than the hundreds of millions of dollars Appellants paid them under the subject loan agreements
topSupreme Court's willingness to "work things out" after punctuating its 35-page decision with the bombshell proclamation that non-party businesses are now to be dissolved is simply untenable.
topTerminating non-party business licenses without jurisdiction, without process, without statutory authority, without trial, and without reason renders impossible the lawful operation of multiple businesses and threatens termination of hundreds of New York employees without any jurisdiction or due process
topSupreme Court's willingness to "work things out" after punctuating its 35-page decision with the bombshell proclamation that non-party businesses are now to be dissolved is simply untenable
topSupreme Court's willingness to "work things out" after punctuating its 35-page decision with the bombshell proclamation that non-party businesses are now to be dissolved is simply untenable.
top... without jurisdiction, without process, without statutory authority, without trial, and without reason renders impossible the lawful operation of multiple businesses and threatens termination of hundreds of New York employees without any jurisdiction or due process.
top... State based on its finding that the international commercial banks with which Appellants transacted should have made more than the hundreds of millions of dollars Appellants paid them under the subject loan agreements.
topThus, Supreme Court justified its refusal to dismiss any of the Attorney General's claims because all of the loan transactions, no matter when entered, entailed continuing contractual obligations to submit annual certification...
top... "controlling case law," which it avers "holds that a cause of action accrues at the time 'when one misrepresents a material fact.'Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v Moskovitz, 86 NY2d 112, 12[2] (1995)." Id.
top... accrual in favor of "controlling case law," which it avers "holds that a cause of action accrues at the time 'when one misrepresents a material fact.'Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v Moskovitz, 86 NY2d 112, 12[2] (1995)." Id.
top... Court's definition of accrual in favor of "controlling case law," which it avers "holds that a cause of action accrues at the time 'when one misrepresents a material fact.'Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v Moskovitz, 86 NY2d 112, 12[2] (1995)." Id.
topSupreme Court then proceeds to reject this Court's definition of accrual in favor of "controlling case law," which it avers "holds that a cause of action accrues at the time 'when one misrepresents a material fact.'Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v Moskovitz, 86 NY2d 112, 12[2] (1995)." Id
topIn Boesky, this Court determined that the fraud claim accrued between 2002 and 2004, when the plaintiffs actually invested in tax shelters of questionable legitimacy, notwithstanding that the plaintiffs alleged...
top... the record was sufficiently clear that she was not subject to the tolling agreement and the Attorney General's allegations did "not support any claims that accrued after February 6, 2016." Robert Aff., Ex. G at 1, 4 (emphasis added). Thus, this Court held that "all claims against [Ms
top... accrued between 2002 and 2004, when the plaintiffs actually invested in tax shelters of questionable legitimacy, notwithstanding that the plaintiffs alleged the defendants continued to provide flawed and erroneous advice through 2016.
top... Attorney General's allegations did "not support any claims that accrued after February 6, 2016." Robert Aff., Ex. G at 1, 4 (emphasis added). Thus, this Court held that "all claims against [Ms. Trump] should have been dismissed as untimely." Id.
topThereafter, prior to summary judgment, the Attorney General consistently maintained that Appellants'use of the SFCs to obtain favorable loan or insurance terms were the wrongs she sought to redress.10 Under this original theory, the Attorney General argued that subsequent, post-closing certifications as to the veracity...
topThe far reaching implications of its unprecedented directives are of staggering consequence to Appellants and innocent non-parties whose only connection is an affiliation with individuals the Attorney General has previously sworn to punish if elected
topNor was anyone ever put on notice that Supreme Court was considering summarily depriving these Appellants and non-parties of their property rights without any process whatsoever.
topThereafter, prior to summary judgment, the Attorney General consistently maintained that Appellants'use of the SFCs to obtain favorable loan or insurance terms were the wrongs she sought to redress.10 Under this original theory, the Attorney General argued that subsequent, post-closing certifications as to the veracity of the SFCs, as required...
top... SFCs to obtain favorable loan or insurance terms were the wrongs she sought to redress.10 Under this original theory, the Attorney General argued that subsequent, post-closing certifications as to the veracity of the SFCs, as required by the loan documents, simply constituted continuing wrongs extending the applicable limitations period.11 In its decision denying Appellants'and Ms
topThus, even assuming, arguendo, that Supreme Court properly determined that all of the non-signatory Appellants are bound by the tolling agreement, most of the Attorney General's claims are nonetheless untimely as a matter of law.
topThus, even assuming, arguendo, that Supreme Court properly determined that all of the non-signatory Appellants are bound by the tolling agreement, most of the Attorney General's claims are nonetheless untimely as a matter of law
topEven though this issue (and the issue of remedies in general) was not raised at all in the Attorney General's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Supreme Court, sua sponte, took the foregoing and inflated it to "continued [] disseminat[ion of] false and misleading information." Id
topEven though this issue (and the issue of remedies in general) was not raised at all in the Attorney General's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Supreme Court, sua sponte, took the foregoing and inflated it to "continued [] disseminat[ion of] false and misleading information." Id
topThereafter, prior to summary judgment, the Attorney General consistently maintained that Appellants'use of the SFCs to obtain favorable loan or insurance terms were the wrongs she sought to redress.10 Under this original theory, the Attorney General argued that subsequent, post-closing certifications as to the veracity of the SFCs, as required by the loan documents, simply constituted continuing wrongs...
top... maintained that Appellants'use of the SFCs to obtain favorable loan or insurance terms were the wrongs she sought to redress.10 Under this original theory, the Attorney General argued that subsequent, post-closing certifications as to the veracity of the SFCs, as required by the loan documents, simply constituted continuing wrongs extending the applicable limitations period.11 In its decision denying Appellants'and Ms
topSupreme Court's finding that Appellants are liable under Executive Law 63(12) for "persistent and repeated fraud" arising from loan transactions outside of the statutory limitations period contravenes this Court's...
topSupreme Court summarily cancelled the business certificates of party and non-party entities operating lawful businesses in the State based on its finding that the international commercial banks with which Appellants...
top("Justice Engoron"), dated September 26, 2023, and duly entered by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, on September 27, 2023, as supplemented by the Supplemental Order dated October 4, 2023, and duly entered on October 5, 2023, (1) denying Appellants'motion for summary judgment in its...
topCompounding the injustices imposed by the MSJ Decision, Supreme Court also directed the parties to proceed to trial on claims this Court dismissed as time-barred several months ago, claims over which Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Moreover, in preparing for trial, Appellants rightfully relied on the First Department Decision's dismissal of most of the...
top... directed the parties to proceed to trial on claims this Court dismissed as time-barred several months ago, claims over which Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Moreover, in preparing for trial, Appellants rightfully relied on the First Department Decision's dismissal of most of the claims in this action
topCompounding the injustices imposed by the MSJ Decision, Supreme Court also directed the parties to proceed to trial on claims this Court dismissed as time-barred several months ago, claims over which Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction
top... of New York's (the "Attorney General") motion for partial summary judgment, (3) cancelling any certificates filed under and by virtue of GBL 130 by any of the entity Appellants or any other non-party entity controlled or beneficially owned by any of the individual Appellants, and (4) directing that the parties recommend the names of no more than three independent receivers to manage the dissolution...
topRather than resolve any of the pressing questions Appellants have raised regarding how the far-reaching MSJ Decision will be implemented, Supreme Court required Appellants to provide detailed lists of party and non party entities with GBL 130 certificates and third parties with ownership interests in the entities to...
topObviously, the transactions were not "completed" while the defendants were still obligated to, and did, annually submit current SFCs to comply with the terms of the loan agreements.. . Robert Aff., Ex. Thus, Supreme Court justified its refusal to dismiss any of the Attorney General's claims because all of the loan transactions,...
topSpecifically, it held that the Attorney General's claims are time-barred where they are premised on transactions - here, loan agreements with commercial entities - completed outside of the statutory limitations period
topSpecifically, it held that the Attorney General's claims are time-barred where they are premised on transactions - here, loan agreements with commercial entities - completed outside of the statutory limitations period
topThereafter, prior to summary judgment, the Attorney General consistently maintained that Appellants'use of the SFCs to obtain favorable loan or insurance terms were the wrongs she sought to redress.10 Under this original theory, the Attorney General argued that subsequent, post-closing certifications as to the veracity of the SFCs, as required by the...
top... she sought to redress.10 Under this original theory, the Attorney General argued that subsequent, post-closing certifications as to the veracity of the SFCs, as required by the loan documents, simply constituted continuing wrongs extending the applicable limitations period.11 In its decision denying Appellants'and Ms
top... never sought such relief either in her complaint or in her motion for partial summary judgment, Appellants were never provided any notice or opportunity to be heard and to defend against the award of the MSJ Order's relief.
topThe MSJ Order also penalizes, sua sponte, legitimate non-party business entities whom the Attorney General neither named as Defendants nor identified in the underlying action and over which Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
top... manner." While BCL 1101(c) provides that these grounds are not exclusive,9 it lacks any provision sufficient to permit Supreme Court to transform a cause of action under Executive Law 63(12) into one under BCL 1101 sua sponte.
top... Attorney General can bring an action for dissolution of a corporation, including that the corporation "carried on, conducted or transacted its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal manner." While BCL 1101(c) provides that these grounds are not exclusive,9 it lacks any provision sufficient to permit Supreme Court to transform a cause of action under Executive Law 63(12) into one under BCL 1101 sua...
topBCL 1101 delineates specific grounds upon which the Attorney General can bring an action for dissolution of a corporation, including that the corporation "carried on, conducted or transacted its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal manner." While BCL 1101(c) provides that these grounds are not exclusive,9 it lacks any provision sufficient to permit Supreme Court to transform...
topThe MSJ Order also penalizes, sua sponte, legitimate non-party business entities whom the Attorney General neither named as Defendants nor identified in the underlying action and over which Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
topEven though this issue (and the issue of remedies in general) was not raised at all in the Attorney General's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Supreme Court, sua sponte, took the foregoing and inflated it to "continued [] disseminat[ion of] false and misleading information." Id
topExecutive Law 63(12) only authorizes a Court to grant "the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper." There is simply no statutory basis for Supreme Court to grant non-requested relief sua sponte. Additionally, since the Attorney General never sought such relief either in her complaint or in her motion for partial summary judgment, Appellants were never provided any notice or...
topThe MSJ Order also penalizes, sua sponte, legitimate non-party business entities whom the Attorney General neither named as Defendants nor identified in the underlying action and over which Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
top... persistently fraudulent or illegal manner." While BCL 1101(c) provides that these grounds are not exclusive,9 it lacks any provision sufficient to permit Supreme Court to transform a cause of action under Executive Law 63(12) into one under BCL 1101 sua sponte.
top... timely claim, in granting the Attorney General injunctive relief that is overbroad, unrequested, and unauthorized. Nonetheless, Supreme Court directed the wholesale and immediate cancellation of party and non-party business entities.
topThe only discretionary act left with respect to these time-barred claims was for Supreme Court to decide which of the defendants were bound by the tolling agreement in order to apply the proper cut-off date
topSupreme Court summarily cancelled the business certificates of party and non-party entities operating lawful businesses in the State based on its finding that the international commercial banks with which Appellants transacted should have made more than the hundreds of millions of dollars Appellants paid them under the subject loan agreements
topSpecifically, it held that the Attorney General's claims are time-barred where they are premised on transactions - here, loan agreements with commercial entities - completed outside of the statutory limitations period. The only discretionary act left with respect to these time-barred claims was for Supreme Court to decide which of the defendants were...
topTrump conclusively resolves the matter. At the pleading stage, Supreme Court sustained claims against Ms. Trump based on Deutsche Bank loan transactions entered into in 2011, with terms extending past 2022, wherein Appellants were obligated to submit annual certifications
top... Supreme Court's conclusion is based solely on its mischaracterization of the observations of an independent monitor it appointed last year to review financial and accounting information submitted to lenders by the Trump Organization.
top... While BCL 1101(c) provides that these grounds are not exclusive,9 it lacks any provision sufficient to permit Supreme Court to transform a cause of action under Executive Law 63(12) into one under BCL 1101 sua sponte.
top... 1101(c) provides that these grounds are not exclusive,9 it lacks any provision sufficient to permit Supreme Court to transform a cause of action under Executive Law 63(12) into one under BCL 1101 sua sponte.
topIn the end, Supreme Court justifies the attempted destruction of a multi-billion-dollar New York real-estate empire with the observation that, in recent months, an independent monitor has said some information one Appellant submitted to lenders was "incomplete." Supreme Court's grant of injunctive...
top... that Appellants are liable under Executive Law 63(12) for "persistent and repeated fraud" arising from loan transactions outside of the statutory limitations period contravenes this Court's unanimous June 27, 2023, decision (the "First Department Decision"). The decretal paragraph of the First Department Decision makes clear this Court did not affirm Supreme Court
top... wrongdoing in favor of an overinclusive guilt-by association approach, in a single decretal paragraph, Supreme Court sounds the death knell of multiple non-party entities authorized to do business in New York without notice or due process.
top("Justice Engoron"), dated September 26, 2023, and duly entered by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, on September 27, 2023, as supplemented by the Supplemental Order dated October 4, 2023, and duly entered on October...
top... Court has openly stated that it considered all evidence, including conduct it concedes cannot form the basis of any timely claim, in granting the Attorney General injunctive relief that is overbroad, unrequested, and unauthorized. Nonetheless, Supreme Court directed the wholesale and immediate cancellation of party and non-party business entities
top("Justice Engoron"), dated September 26, 2023, and duly entered by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, on September 27, 2023, as supplemented by the Supplemental Order dated October 4, 2023, and duly entered on October 5, 2023, (1) denying Appellants'motion for summary judgment in its entirety, (2) granting Plaintiff-Respondent People of the State of New York by...
topThe MSJ Order also penalizes, sua sponte, legitimate non-party business entities whom the Attorney General neither named as Defendants nor identified in the underlying action and over which Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
topAdditionally, since the Attorney General never sought such relief either in her complaint or in her motion for partial summary judgment, Appellants were never provided any notice or opportunity to be heard and to defend against the award of the MSJ Order's relief
topThat Supreme Court has, sua sponte, ordered the immediate cancellation of the business licenses and dissolution of the entity Appellants without any statutory authority in and of itself warrants a stay.
topLikewise, Supreme Court's sua sponte decision to terminate all entities controlled or beneficially owned by Donald Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, Allen Weisselberg, and Jeffrey McConney is an abuse of authority writ large.
top... Appellants or any other non-party entity controlled or beneficially owned by any of the individual Appellants, and (4) directing that the parties recommend the names of no more than three independent receivers to manage the dissolution of the cancelled LLCs (the "MSJ Decision").1.
top... September 27, 2023, as supplemented by the Supplemental Order dated October 4, 2023, and duly entered on October 5, 2023, (1) denying Appellants'motion for summary judgment in its entirety, (2) granting Plaintiff-Respondent People of the State of New York by Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York's (the "Attorney General") motion for partial summary judgment, (3) cancelling any certificates filed...
topEschewing actual findings of wrongdoing in favor of an overinclusive guilt-by association approach, in a single decretal paragraph, Supreme Court sounds the death knell of multiple non-party entities authorized to do business in New York without notice or due process
topIn the end, Supreme Court justifies the attempted destruction of a multi-billion-dollar New York real-estate empire with the observation that, in recent months, an independent monitor has said some information one Appellant submitted to lenders was "incomplete." Supreme Court's...
top... or beneficially owned by any of the individual Appellants, and (4) directing that the parties recommend the names of no more than three independent receivers to manage the dissolution of the cancelled LLCs (the "MSJ Decision").1.
top... dated October 4, 2023, and duly entered on October 5, 2023, (1) denying Appellants'motion for summary judgment in its entirety, (2) granting Plaintiff-Respondent People of the State of New York by Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York's (the "Attorney General") motion for partial summary judgment, (3) cancelling any certificates filed under and by virtue of GBL 130 by any of the entity Appellants...
topEschewing actual findings of wrongdoing in favor of an overinclusive guilt-by association approach, in a single decretal paragraph, Supreme Court sounds the death knell of multiple non-party entities authorized to do business in New York without notice or due process
top... paramount importance." Other than vague, footnoted allusions to "distort[ion] [of] the lending marketplace," Supreme Court identifies no preeminent public interest that its summary cessation of lawful business enterprises effectuates.
topFurther, BCL 1111(b)(1) mandates that "[i]n an action brought by the attorney-general, the interest of the public is of paramount importance." Other than vague, footnoted allusions to "distort[ion] [of] the lending marketplace," Supreme Court identifies no preeminent public interest that...
top... attorney-general, the interest of the public is of paramount importance." Other than vague, footnoted allusions to "distort[ion] [of] the lending marketplace," Supreme Court identifies no preeminent public interest that its summary cessation of lawful business enterprises effectuates.
topFurther, BCL 1111(b)(1) mandates that "[i]n an action brought by the attorney-general, the interest of the public is of paramount importance." Other than vague, footnoted allusions to "distort[ion] [of] the lending marketplace,"...
topFurther, BCL 1111(b)(1) mandates that "[i]n an action brought by the attorney-general, the interest of the public is of paramount importance." Other than vague, footnoted allusions to "distort[ion] [of] the lending marketplace," Supreme Court identifies no preeminent public interest that its summary cessation of lawful business enterprises effectuates
topSupreme Court's wholesale grant of dissolution by fiat absent a BCL 1101 claim, any prior request for such relief, or notice that it was considering granting such relief is an egregious violation of Appellants'due process rights and in clear excess of...
top... motions to dismiss the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to dismiss, as time barred, the claims against defendant Ivanka Trump and the claims against the remaining defendants to the extent they accrued prior to July 2014 (with respect to those defendants subject to the August 2021 tolling agreement) and February 2016 (with respect to those defendants not subject to the August 2021 tolling agreement).
topFor defendants bound by the tolling agreement, claims are untimely if they accrued before July 13, 2014.. Id. The Court then "le[ft to] Supreme Court to determine, if necessary, the full range of defendants bound by the tolling agreement." Id
topThus, even assuming, arguendo, that Supreme Court properly determined that all of the non-signatory Appellants are bound by the tolling agreement, most of the Attorney General's claims are nonetheless untimely as a matter of law
topThe only discretionary act left with respect to these time-barred claims was for Supreme Court to decide which of the defendants were bound by the tolling agreement in order to apply the proper cut-off date.
topThus, even assuming, arguendo, that Supreme Court properly determined that all of the non-signatory Appellants are bound by the tolling agreement, most of the Attorney General's claims are nonetheless untimely as a matter of law.
topThus, even assuming, arguendo, that Supreme Court properly determined that all of the non-signatory Appellants are bound by the tolling agreement, most of the Attorney General's claims are nonetheless untimely as a matter of law
topThus, even assuming, arguendo, that Supreme Court properly determined that all of the non-signatory Appellants are bound by the tolling agreement, most of the Attorney General's claims are nonetheless untimely as a matter of law
topThe "fraudulent financial documents" consist of SFCs that the Attorney General contends inflated the valuation of Appellants'businesses, thus obtaining the "financial benefits" of loans with interest rates lower than the Attorney General believes...
topThe implications of the First Department Decision could not be clearer: the Attorney General's claims are untimely as to all Appellants to the extent they are premised on transactions that accrued - that is, loans that closed - outside of the statutory period
topIn order to impose such a remedy for repeated fraud, the Attorney General must seek relief pursuant to BCL 1101. Nonetheless, the Attorney General does not bring any claim pursuant to BCL 1101 against Appellants
topThe far reaching implications of its unprecedented directives are of staggering consequence to Appellants and innocent non-parties whose only connection is an affiliation with individuals the Attorney General has previously sworn to punish if elected.
topThe implications of the First Department Decision could not be clearer: the Attorney General's claims are untimely as to all Appellants to the extent they are premised on transactions that accrued - that is, loans that closed - outside of the statutory...
topIn order to impose such a remedy for repeated fraud, the Attorney General must seek relief pursuant to BCL 1101. Nonetheless, the Attorney General does not bring any claim pursuant to BCL 1101 against Appellants
top... unprecedented and unlawfully punitive directive is in excess of any remedy provided for by Executive Law 63(12). BCL 1101, not the Executive Law, empowers the Attorney General to seek judicial dissolution of a corporate entity, but the Attorney General's 838-paragraph complaint contains no reference to Article 11 of the BCL or dissolution
top... conducted or transacted its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal manner." While BCL 1101(c) provides that these grounds are not exclusive,9 it lacks any provision sufficient to permit Supreme Court to transform a cause of action under Executive Law 63(12) into one under BCL 1101 sua sponte
topBCL 1101 delineates specific grounds upon which the Attorney General can bring an action for dissolution of a corporation, including that the corporation "carried on, conducted or transacted its business in a persistently...
topEven Supreme Court does not so much as reference dissolution in its multi-page discussion of "injunctive relief." It quotes the relevant portion of Executive Law 63(12), which authorizes cancellation of business certificates, and proceeds to hold as follows:
topThis Court, in affirming Supreme Court in its entirety, likewise characterized the relief sought as follows: "[t]he State brought this special proceeding against respondents under Executive Law 63(12) for engaging...
top... likewise characterized the relief sought as follows: "[t]he State brought this special proceeding against respondents under Executive Law 63(12) for engaging in repeated and persistent fraud and under Business Corporation Law (BCL) 1102(a)(2) to have Northern Leasing System dissolved." 193 A.D.3d at 72
topEven Supreme Court does not so much as reference dissolution in its multi-page discussion of "injunctive relief." It quotes the relevant portion of Executive Law 63(12), which authorizes cancellation of business certificates, and proceeds to hold as follows:.
topAs set forth above, Executive Law 63(12) does not authorize judicial dissolution. In order to impose such a remedy for repeated fraud, the Attorney General must seek relief pursuant to BCL 1101.
topIn order to impose such a remedy for repeated fraud, the Attorney General must seek relief pursuant to BCL 1101. Nonetheless, the Attorney General does not bring any claim pursuant to BCL 1101 against Appellants.
top. BCL 1101 delineates specific grounds upon which the Attorney General can bring an action for dissolution of a corporation, including that the corporation "carried on, conducted or transacted its business in a persistently...
top... illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York, to the supreme court of the state of New York, on notice of five days, for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and...
topThis Court, in affirming Supreme Court in its entirety, likewise characterized the relief sought as follows: "[t]he State brought this special proceeding against respondents under Executive Law 63(12) for engaging in repeated and persistent...
top... conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York, to the supreme court of the state of New York, on notice of five days, for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and damages and, in an appropriate case, cancelling any certificate filed under and by virtue of...
top... transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York, to the supreme court of the state of New York, on notice of five days, for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and damages and, in an appropriate case, cancelling any certificate filed under and by virtue of the provisions of
top... New York, on notice of five days, for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and damages and, in an appropriate case, cancelling any certificate filed under and by virtue of the provisions of.
top... proceeding was brought pursuant to, inter alia, BCL 1101(a)(1), (a)(2), and the Court "order[ed] dissolution of THI [pursuant to] (s 63(12) of Executive Law; sections 1101(a)(1), (2) and 109(a)(5) of the Business Corporation Law)." 374 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
topWhenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York, to the supreme court of the state of New York, on notice of five days, for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity...
topAs set forth above, Executive Law 63(12) does not authorize judicial dissolution. In order to impose such a remedy for repeated fraud, the Attorney General must seek relief pursuant to BCL 1101. Nonetheless, the Attorney General does not bring any claim pursuant to BCL 1101 against Appellants
top... "[t]he State brought this special proceeding against respondents under Executive Law 63(12) for engaging in repeated and persistent fraud and under Business Corporation Law (BCL) 1102(a)(2) to have Northern Leasing System dissolved." 193 A.D.3d at 72. Oliver Schools, the Attorney General specifically commenced an action for dissolution pursuant to Article 11 of the BCL, and the Court granted relief exclusively on...
topObviously, the transactions were not "completed" while the defendants were still obligated to, and did, annually submit current SFCs to comply with the terms of the loan agreements.. . Robert Aff., Ex. Thus, Supreme Court justified its refusal to dismiss any of the Attorney General's claims because all of the loan transactions, no matter when entered, entailed continuing...
top... has decided that Appellants are liable because the individuals "repeatedly submitted fraudulent financial documents to obtain financial benefits which otherwise they would not have received." Robert Aff., Ex. The "fraudulent financial documents" consist of SFCs that the Attorney General contends inflated the valuation of Appellants'businesses, thus obtaining the "financial benefits" of...
topThe "fraudulent financial documents" consist of SFCs that the Attorney General contends inflated the valuation of Appellants'businesses, thus obtaining the "financial benefits" of loans with interest rates lower than the Attorney General believes Appellants deserved
topSupreme Court expressly relies on claims and transactions unquestionably outside of the statutory period in granting expansive injunctive relief: "Although any liability arising out of the submission of the 2011 and 2012 SFCs is time barred; as previously discussed, these...
topSupreme Court expressly relies on claims and transactions unquestionably outside of the statutory period in granting expansive injunctive relief: "Although any liability arising out of the submission of the 2011 and 2012 SFCs is time barred; as previously discussed, these submissions may be considered as evidence in support of [the Attorney General]'s request for injunctive relief." Robert Aff., Ex
topSupreme Court expressly relies on claims and transactions unquestionably outside of the statutory period in granting expansive injunctive relief: "Although any liability arising out of the submission of the 2011 and 2012 SFCs is time barred; as previously discussed, these submissions may be considered as evidence in support of [the Attorney General]'s request for...
topSupreme Court's application of such punitive relief to remedy purported misconduct outside the statutory period, to non-parties, in the absence of a request from the Attorney General, and without statutory authority...
topMoreover, only once in the 176 page transcript of oral argument on the motions for summary judgment is cancellation of business certificates even mentioned. That single allusion to this drastic remedy by the Attorney General comes in the context of "remaining claims left for...
top... such punitive relief to remedy purported misconduct outside the statutory period, to non-parties, in the absence of a request from the Attorney General, and without statutory authority also violates the LOTC and bedrock principles of due process and fundamental fairness.
top... Attorney General demonstrates "persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business," "such [i.e., the fraudulent] business activity" may be permanently enjoined.
topExecutive Law 63(12) permits neither purely punitive relief nor the wholesale dissolution of a business entity whose principal business activities are legal and appropriate simply because certain discrete transactions are determined to be "fraudulent or illegal." Indeed, the statute does not contain any reference to dissolution as a remedy for fraud
top. The MSJ Order also penalizes, sua sponte, legitimate non-party business entities whom the Attorney General neither named as Defendants nor identified in the underlying action and over which Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
topExecutive Law 63(12) only authorizes a Court to grant "the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper." There is simply no statutory basis for Supreme Court to grant non-requested relief sua sponte.
top. The MSJ Order also penalizes, sua sponte, legitimate non-party business entities whom the Attorney General neither named as Defendants nor identified in the underlying action and over which Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
top. The MSJ Order also penalizes, sua sponte, legitimate non-party business entities whom the Attorney General neither named as Defendants nor identified in the underlying action and over which Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
topHere, Supreme Court has decided that Appellants are liable because the individuals "repeatedly submitted fraudulent financial documents to obtain financial benefits which otherwise they would not have received." Robert Aff., Ex
topThe "fraudulent financial documents" consist of SFCs that the Attorney General contends inflated the valuation of Appellants'businesses, thus obtaining the "financial benefits" of loans with interest rates lower than the Attorney General believes Appellants deserved
top... Attorney General]'s request for permanent injunctive relief, wherein the Court must determine whether there has been 'a showing of a reasonable likelihood of a continuing violation based upon the totality of the circumstances.'People v Greenberg, 27 NY3d 490, 496-97 (2016)." Id.
topTrump because the record was sufficiently clear that she was not subject to the tolling agreement and the Attorney General's allegations did "not support any claims that accrued after February 6, 2016." Robert Aff., Ex
topHere, Supreme Court has decided that Appellants are liable because the individuals "repeatedly submitted fraudulent financial documents to obtain financial benefits which otherwise they would not have received."...
top... relief, wherein the Court must determine whether there has been 'a showing of a reasonable likelihood of a continuing violation based upon the totality of the circumstances.'People v Greenberg, 27 NY3d 490, 496-97 (2016)." Id.
topAppellants, nonparties, and hundreds of employees will suffer hardship in the absence of a stay. Under New York law, irreparable injury is that which cannot be compensated by money damages.
top... "accrued" when "transactions were completed." Supreme Court suggests that this Court's use of "completed" rather than "closed" indicates that it rejected Appellants (and Ms. Trump's) contention that the accrual date for each loan was its closing date.
top... "[i]n an action brought by the attorney-general, the interest of the public is of paramount importance." Other than vague, footnoted allusions to "distort[ion] [of] the lending marketplace," Supreme Court identifies no preeminent public interest that its summary cessation of lawful business enterprises effectuates
top. Further, BCL 1111(b)(1) mandates that "[i]n an action brought by the attorney-general, the interest of the public is of paramount importance." Other than vague, footnoted allusions to "distort[ion] [of] the lending marketplace," Supreme Court identifies no preeminent public interest that...
topIn order to impose such a remedy for repeated fraud, the Attorney General must seek relief pursuant to BCL 1101. Nonetheless, the Attorney General does not bring any claim pursuant to BCL 1101 against Appellants
top. Further, BCL 1111(b)(1) mandates that "[i]n an action brought by the attorney-general, the interest of the public is of paramount importance." Other than vague, footnoted allusions to "distort[ion] [of] the lending marketplace,"...
topSupreme Court's wholesale grant of dissolution by fiat absent a BCL 1101 claim, any prior request for such relief, or notice that it was considering granting such relief is an egregious violation of Appellants'due process rights and in clear excess of Supreme Court's lawful jurisdiction
topCompounding the injustices imposed by the MSJ Decision, Supreme Court also directed the parties to proceed to trial on claims this Court dismissed as time-barred several months ago, claims over which Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Moreover, in preparing for trial, Appellants rightfully relied on the First Department Decision's dismissal of most of the claims in this action
topConsequently, it was plain error for Supreme Court to refuse to dismiss such claims and to grant the Attorney General judgment thereupon
topv Seng, 177 AD3d 463, 464 (1st Dept 2019) (finding continuous series of wrongs each of which gave rise to its own claim)." Id. at 17.. . Supreme Court derides Appellants'argument for dismissal of time-barred claims as demanding that it "apply a bizarre, invented, inverted form of the 'relation back'doctrine." Id
topConsequently, it was plain error for Supreme Court to refuse to dismiss such claims and to grant the Attorney General judgment thereupon. Moreover, forcing Appellants to defend against time-barred claims at trial exceeds Sumpreme Court's jurisdiction and ensures chaos and a continuing compounding of error
top... plain error for Supreme Court to refuse to dismiss such claims and to grant the Attorney General judgment thereupon. Moreover, forcing Appellants to defend against time-barred claims at trial exceeds Sumpreme Court's jurisdiction and ensures chaos and a continuing compounding of error.
top... proceed to trial on claims this Court dismissed as time-barred several months ago, claims over which Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Moreover, in preparing for trial, Appellants rightfully relied on the First Department Decision's dismissal of most of the claims in this action.
topFurther, BCL 1111(b)(1) mandates that "[i]n an action brought by the attorney-general, the interest of the public is of paramount importance." Other than vague, footnoted allusions to "distort[ion] [of]...
topSupreme Court's wholesale grant of dissolution by fiat absent a BCL 1101 claim, any prior request for such relief, or notice that it was considering granting such relief is an egregious violation of Appellants'due process rights and in clear excess of Supreme Court's...
topIn sum, Supreme Court has directly contravened the law of the case, abused its discretion, proceeded in the absence of statutory authority, and exceeded its lawful jurisdiction
topSupreme Court's wholesale grant of dissolution by fiat absent a BCL 1101 claim, any prior request for such relief, or notice that it was considering granting such relief is an egregious violation of Appellants'due process rights and in clear excess of Supreme Court's lawful jurisdiction.
top... than vague, footnoted allusions to "distort[ion] [of] the lending marketplace," Supreme Court identifies no preeminent public interest that its summary cessation of lawful business enterprises effectuates.
topIn sum, Supreme Court has directly contravened the law of the case, abused its discretion, proceeded in the absence of statutory authority, and exceeded its lawful jurisdiction
topThe implications of the First Department Decision could not be clearer: the Attorney General's claims are untimely as to all Appellants to the extent they are premised on transactions that accrued - that is, loans that closed - outside of the statutory period
topThe implications of the First Department Decision could not be clearer: the Attorney General's claims are untimely as to all Appellants to the extent they are premised on transactions that accrued - that is, loans that closed - outside of the statutory period.
top... summarily depriving these Appellants and non-parties of their property rights without any process whatsoever. Even more unsettling is that Supreme Court ordered dissolution as a remedy at all when the Attorney General never asked for it, the statute authorizing her claims does not permit it, and there is no New York caselaw to support its application
topIn order to impose such a remedy for repeated fraud, the Attorney General must seek relief pursuant to BCL 1101. Nonetheless, the Attorney General does not bring any claim pursuant to BCL 1101 against Appellants
topNor was anyone ever put on notice that Supreme Court was considering summarily depriving these Appellants and non-parties of their property rights without any process whatsoever
topHyman v Able & Ready Appliance Repair Corp., 193 A.D.3d 509, 510 (1st Dep't 2021) ("The presence of a general relief clause enables the court to grant relief that is not too dramatically unlike that which is actually sought, as long as the relief is supported by proof in the papers and the court is satisfied that no party is prejudiced.")
topNor was anyone ever put on notice that Supreme Court was considering summarily depriving these Appellants and non-parties of their property rights without any process whatsoever. Even more unsettling is that Supreme Court ordered dissolution as a remedy at all when the Attorney General never asked for it, the statute authorizing her claims does not permit it, and there is no New York caselaw to support...
topHyman v Able & Ready Appliance Repair Corp., 193 A.D.3d 509, 510 (1st Dep't 2021) ("The presence of a general relief clause enables the court to grant relief that is not too dramatically unlike that which is actually sought, as long as...
top... enables the court to grant relief that is not too dramatically unlike that which is actually sought, as long as the relief is supported by proof in the papers and the court is satisfied that no party is prejudiced."). Appellants and the affected nonparties also had no ability to defend against a remedy that has never been mentioned in this action
top... dramatically unlike that which is actually sought, as long as the relief is supported by proof in the papers and the court is satisfied that no party is prejudiced."). Appellants and the affected nonparties also had no ability to defend against a remedy that has never been mentioned in this action
topNor was anyone ever put on notice that Supreme Court was considering summarily depriving these Appellants and non-parties of their property rights without any process whatsoever. Even more unsettling is that Supreme Court ordered dissolution as a remedy at all when the Attorney General never asked for it, the statute authorizing...
topHyman v Able & Ready Appliance Repair Corp., 193 A.D.3d 509, 510 (1st Dep't 2021) ("The presence of a general relief clause enables the court to grant relief that is not too dramatically unlike that which is actually sought, as long as the relief is supported by proof in...